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CORRECTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THROUGH COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE
RIGOROUSLY EXAMINED
JAMES S. LIEBMAN* & DAVID MATTERNt
ABSTRACT

Federal and state law confers broad discretion on courts to
administerthe criminal laws, impose powerful penalties, and leave serious
criminal behavior unpunished. Each time an appellate court reviews a
criminal verdict, it performs an important systemic function of regulating
the exercise of that power. Trial courts do the same when, for example,
they admit or exclude evidence generatedby government investigators.For
decades,judicialdecisions of this sort have been guided by case law made
during the Supreme Court's Criminal ProcedureRevolution of the 1960s
and 1970s. It is becoming increasingly clear,however, that the rule-bound,
essentially bureaucraticregulatory regime that emerged in the 1960s does
not assure accurate outcomes, especially for poor and minority criminal
defendants and victims. As an additional protection, this Essay urges
criminal courts to stop resisting and to embrace regulatory innovations in
wide use in other domains thatfoster self-improvement through continuous
observation and rigorous analysis of data on the system's own results and
error rates. The Supreme Court's own penalty-default and head-counting
innovations point the way forward. A certain conception of liberty or
individualism-which intersected with the Criminal ProcedureRevolution
but has not traditionally served the interests of populations most at risk
from miscarriagesof criminaljustice-is the main obstacle to such reforms
andshould be abandoned.
* Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
t J.D. 2013, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Elizabeth Cruikshank for superb
research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, a funny thing happened to U.S. criminal law.
Forces concerned about the welfare of the poor and racial minorities
aligned with a longstanding libertarian strain in American life to promote
the Criminal Procedure Revolution.' The result was to afford judicially
enforceable procedural protections against potentially abusive police,
prosecutorial, and trial tactics to individuals suspected of or charged with
crimes. This alignment was unusual. For most of American history before
and since, criminal courts and other actors impelled by this libertarian or
individualistic impulse, which is often combined with forms of
parochialism and populism, have stymied the interests of the poor and
racial minorities through slavery, 2 racial segregation,' lynching,' capital
punishment,s and harsh mandatory sentencing. 6 These forces have also
1. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or SelfRestraint?,47 MD. L. REV. 118, 126-27 (1987) (praising the Warren Court's evolution into "the branch
of government in which the libertarian, egalitarian and humanitarian impulses beat the strongest"); John
Paul Stevens, Our 'Broken System' of CriminalJustice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 10, 2011) (reviewing
WILLIAM

J.

STUNTz,

THE

COLLAPSE

OF

THE

AMERICAN

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

SYSTEM),

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/10/our-broken-system-criminal-justice/
(crediting
the Warren Court with "clearly correct" judgments about the need to protect the liberty of unpopular
suspects through professionalized procedure).
2. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450-51 (1856) ("[T]he rights of private
property have been guarded with ... care . . . [a]nd an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the
United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States ... could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of
law.... [T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.").
3. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (approving state-mandated racial
segregation given the futility of government interference with individuals' "racial instincts").
4.

See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF

ABOLITION 33-34, 172 (2010) (describing the role of public lynching in the American justice system
and in slave discipline); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 89 (2003) ("[T]he propensity to execute in the twenty-first century is a direct legacy of a
history of lynching and of the vigilante tradition if it is still a part of regional culture."); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, Introduction to FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA 1, 7-8 (Charles J. Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (describing a
link drawn by works in this collection of essays between modern death-sentencing and historical
lynching practices in the United States); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, CapitalPunishment as Legal
Lynching?, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN

AMERICA, supra,at 21, 21-23 (equating modern racial disparities in capital punishment to lynching).
5. A number of commentators have linked the death penalty's use in the United States to
libertarian values. E.g., GARLAND, supra note 4, at 35-36; James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority
Practice, Majority's Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 273-80 (2011);
ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 44-48.
6.

See

FRANKLIN

ZIMRING,

GORDON

HAWKINS

&

SAM

KAMIN,

PUNISHMENT

AND

DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 231-32 (2001) (concluding that
mistrust of government has led to harsher mandatory-sentencing practices in California). One might
expect libertarian mistrust of government to generate opposition to incarceration and execution. In the
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resisted the right of labor to organize 7 and of government to protect
children, workers, unsophisticated consumers, and other vulnerable
populations from the depredations of unregulated private enterprise. 8
Judicially enforced libertarian opposition to government protection of
vulnerable populations peaked at the end of the nineteenth century and in to
the early 1930s. 9 During much of the remainder of the twentieth century,
the bureaucratization of large-scale business and government activity
gradually led to broad agreement on rules negotiated between central
experts and newly powerful national interest groups representing workers,
low-income individuals, and racial minorities. Through contract,
legislation, and administrative regulation, these agreements rationalized
business and government practice in ways that, among other things,
protected the liberties of workers, the poor, and minority populations.
Exemplified by rules enshrined in lengthy collective bargaining agreements
protecting employee "due process" rights, these regimes proceeded on the
sensible assumption that individuals empowered by such rights were more
likely to cooperate in the productive endeavors, regulatory schemes, and
United States, however, libertarians' strong belief in criminals' moral desert of punishment, together
with their doubts about empowering judges and parole officers to exercise discretion as to the length of
sentences and their parochial concerns about the incursion of crime and other unwelcome outside forces
on local communities, has led libertarian values to coincide with support for mandatory sentences and
executions. For discussions of this phenomenon, see ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 45-48, 98-99, 108-11;
Liebman & Clarke, supra note 5, at 273-80; Angela M. Schadt & Matt DeLisi, Is Vigilantism on Your
Mind? An Exploratory Study of Nuance and Contradiction in Student Death Penalty Opinion, 20 CRIM.
JUST. STUD. 255, 259 (2007).

7. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (overturning New Deal
regulation of coal production as an "intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty
and private property"); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (invalidating a law forbidding
employers to bar employees from joining unions as an "arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land").
8. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage
law as "interfer[ing] with the freedom of contract"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905)
(invalidating limits on the length of bakers' work week as an "unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in
relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate"); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)
(rejecting state regulation of business practices as violating "the right of the citizen .. . to live and work
where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper").
9. Libertarian and laissez-faire economics are linked to the Lochner Court's resistance to
government action protecting vulnerable populations. E.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 135 (1987); BENJAMIN TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE

CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 106-09 (1942); Louis M. Greeley, The Changing Attitude of the Courts
Toward Social Legislation, 5 U. ILL. L. REv. 222, 224-27 (1910); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,

87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877, 880 (1987). See generally Frank R. Strong, The Economic Philosophyof
Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 419 (1973) (arguing that the
Lochner Court used judicial fiat to embed theories of competitive capitalism in the Constitution).
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social-welfare objectives of their business and government interlocutors.
Starting at about the midpoint of the twentieth century, when faced with
business interests or government agencies unprepared to live by such rules
and protections, federal and state courts imposed their own complex rulebased regimes through "public law litigation" designed to enforce due
process and egalitarian rights.'o
The mid-twentieth-century move toward rule-based bureaucratization
and a concern for the due process rights of the poor and minorities
extended to criminal justice agencies in northern and western states,
including urban police forces and prosecuting offices, state police and
justice departments, and state courts." In the South, however, particularly
in nonurban communities, a combination of libertarian resistance to
government and other large institutions, parochial worries about
encroaching aspects of modern life thought to threaten traditional values,
and resistance to extending equal rights to African-Americans led police,
prosecuting, and judicial institutions to resist bureaucratically or judicially
enforced rules.12
10. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (upholding decree setting maximum
number of days inmates could be assigned to punitive isolation cells); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 287 (1977) (affirming decree requiring racially segregated school district to implement
comprehensive remedial programs in literacy instruction, counseling, and career guidance for students
and training for teachers); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976) (upholding decree
implementing comprehensive plan to remedy housing discrimination across the Chicago metropolitan
area); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (requiring states to hold evidentiary hearings before
terminating public assistance payments); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (upholding
decree specifying how Alabama's population would be apportioned among state legislative districts;
setting rules and presumptions governing reapportionment cases generally); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II,
349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (authorizing lower courts to order plans to desegregate school systems
across the nation). For criticism of the quantity, complexity, and top-down or counter-productive nature
of the rules courts imposed, see, for example, Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 117-61 (2003); Donald L. Horowitz,
Decreeing OrganizationalChange: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265,
1288-97; Nathan Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB. INT. 64, 76-80 (1978).
For more favorable views, see, for example, Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1294, 1307-13 (1976); Frank Coffin, The FrontierofRemedies: A
Callfor Exploration,67 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 984-92 (1979).
11.

See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31-39, 194

(2011) (describing increasingly mechanical, rules-based centralization and bureaucratization of criminal
justice during the 1950s-1970s, driven in part by concerns about discrimination against AfricanAmerican suspects); Donald A. Dripps, Does Liberal Procedure Cause Punitive Substance?
Preliminary Evidence from Some Natural Experiments, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 494-97 (2014)
(discussing state court precursors to key Warren Court rulings).
12. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 11, at 208-09 (2011) (discussing ineffectiveness of criminal
justice systems across the American South in the 1950s and 1960s). Cf Stephen J. Schulbofer, Criminal
Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049, 1055, 1058

(2013) (contending that criminal justice system's "disarray," "dysfunction," and "hasty, haphazard
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The U.S. Supreme Court was no stranger to the threat these latter
attitudes and practices posed to the rights of African-Americans and others
outside the white Protestant mainstream,' 3 as evidenced by the Court's
lynchingl 4 and early coerced confession,' 5 right to counsel,'" prosecutorial
misconduct," and jury discriminations decisions. Until the 1960s,
however, the Court confined itself to requiring the most basic features of
Anglo-American criminal process. It was only during the 1960s and
1970s-evidently influenced by the post-New Deal linkage between
bureaucratic rules and due process rights and by urban administrative and
state judicial efforts to bring police officers and prosecutors under the
bureaucratic control of professionalizing agencies 9-that the Court
extended its engagement with criminal justice beyond a focus on the
fundaments of fair process by imposing what amounted to a comprehensive
constitutional code of procedure.20 Over time, these rules encompassed,
among other things: search and seizure;21 interrogations and confessions; 22
procedures [and] incompetent staff' in the 1950s and 1960s extended well beyond the South).
13. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 337-38 (1915) (declining to intervene in criminal
proceedings against a Jewish man charged with raping a white woman, despite evidence that
proceedings were compromised by threats from angry mobs).
14. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923) (holding that a trial at which threats
of mob violence unavoidably influenced the judge, jury and defense lawyers violated due process).
15.
See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957) (precluding the admission of
confessions obtained by subjecting the defendant to prolonged isolation); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (ruling that a physically forced confession offended due process).
16. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (ruling that the state's failure to allow
criminal defendants to secure counsel denied due process).
17. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (overturning conviction based on false
testimony knowingly presented by the prosecution).
18. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (ruling that systematically excluding
Mexican-Americans from jury service violated due process).
19. See STUNTZ, supra note 11, at 31-39, 194 (linking the Warren Court's Criminal Procedure
Revolution to a nationwide trend toward professionalizing and bureaucratizing criminal justice
systems).
20. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 929, 953-54 (1965) (criticizing the Warren Court for transforming fundamental Bill of Rights
protections into a "detailed code of criminal procedure").
21. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (prohibiting admission of evidence against
the accused that was obtained in violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights). Each procedural rule
discussed here proliferated into a body of detailed judicial rules, as defendants sought to extend the
principle, and states' attorneys proposed exceptions to it. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (extending the Mapp exclusionary rule to forfeiture
proceedings).
22. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (prohibiting admission of inculpatory
statements made during custodial interrogation unless police apprised the defendant of his rights to
silence and an attorney). See also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (applying Miranda rule to
interrogations occurring outside the police station context).
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silence in the face of police accusations; 23 eyewitness identification; 24
defense representation; 25 defense access to information in police files;26
competency to stand trial; 27 guilty pleas; 28 jury selection 29 and jury trial;30
admission or exclusion of evidence and argument at trial;3 1 distinguishing
"elements" of the offense subject to rigorous adjudicatory process from
mere sentencing factors; 32 evidentiary presumptions;3 3 burdens and
23. Compare Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178, 2180-82 (2013) (allowing a defendant's
selective failure to answer some but not all police questions prior to his arrest and receipt of Miranda
warnings to be used against him at trial), with Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976) (forbidding
prosecutor to use defendant's silence in the face of police questioning after Miranda warnings were
given against him at trial as proof of guilt).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221, 242 (1967) (establishing due process
requirements for postindictment lineups); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) (extending Wade
to identifications occurring at preliminary hearing).
25. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (concluding that the right to
counsel arises once a judicial officer informs the defendant of the charge against him); Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657-58 (2002) (discussing prior Supreme Court decisions extending a right to
counsel to any prosecution, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, that actually leads to
imprisonment or to a suspended sentence); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963)
(requiring states to provide counsel to indigent felony defendants).
26. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that a prosecution's failure to
provide defense counsel with material exculpatory evidence violated due process); United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1976) (assessing how the specificity of the defendant's pretrial request for
government-held information affects a defendant's Brady rights).
27. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975) (identifying constitutional right not to
be tried when mentally incompetent and requiring trial courts sua sponte to inquire about competence
upon learning of evidence of incompetence); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996)
(invalidating a statute requiring defendants to prove their incompetence to stand trial by clear and
convincing evidence).
28. See decisions cited infra note 56.
29. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (requiring states to exclude jurors who
would automatically vote to sentence any defendant convicted of capital murder to death without
considering mitigating evidence); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike African-Americans from the jury violates equal
protection); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (forbidding states to exclude prospective
jurors for cause in capital cases based on conscientious scruples against capital punishment unless they
make clear that they will not impose death under any circumstances).
30. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1979) (forbidding states to
simultaneously limit juries to six members and allow nonunanimous criminal verdicts); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (extending jury-trial right to state criminal defendants).
31. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004) (redefining the Confrontation
Clause to bar admission against criminal defendants of all accusatory out-of-court statements made by
witnesses to police); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (forbidding states to bar all hypnotically
refreshed memories); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (invalidating a state
evidentiary rule preventing a criminal defendant from presenting important defense witness); Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-28 (1968) (requiring states to exclude codefendant confessions
implicating a concurrently tried defendant who could not cross-examine the codefendant); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965) (barring instructions inviting jurors to infer guilt from
accused's failure to testify).
32. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (requiring jury determination
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standards of proof;3 4 harmless error;3 5 imposition of capital punishment;3 6
and appellate and postconviction process. 7 The goal was to bureaucratize
and professionalize law enforcement through adherence to predictable rules
that protected the rights of previously underprotected individuals. 38
As this Symposium illustrates, the Court's criminal justice code is
under severe pressure today.3 9 The political right criticizes the Court for
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact authorizing an increase in the maximum possible criminal
penalty); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (extending Apprendi to require a jury finding of
any aggravating circumstance that raises the maximum possible penalty from imprisonment to death).
33. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (invalidating evidentiary
presumptions that the jury might interpret as relieving the prosecution of the burden of proof on an
element of a crime); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 52-53 (1969) (holding unconstitutional an
instruction that permitted a jury to infer knowledge of illegal importation from the distinct element of
possession of illegal drugs); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1985) (extending Sandstrom to
rebuttable state evidentiary presumptions).
34. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requiring state to prove every element of
a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (concluding
that the absence of "heat of passion on sudden provocation" was an element of, not an affirmative
defense to, murder under the state law at issue, and thus the prosecution had to prove that element
beyond a reasonable doubt); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam) (ruling
unconstitutional a "'beyond a reasonable doubt' instruction that the jury might have understood to
dilute the Winship standard).
35. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (allowing court to uphold
conviction despite constitutional error by finding the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
36. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (striking down all
death-sentencing laws in the nation as then applied as excessively discretionary). Suggesting the
intricacy of the rules the Court has developed to regulate capital punishment in the wake of Furman,
see, for example, Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (barring states from requiring juror
unanimity before treating a mitigating factor as a basis for a sentence less than death).
37. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (adjudicating effect of "adequate and
independent state law ground" doctrine on availability of federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoner
denied state court relief on the same claim for failure to raise the claim properly); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (establishing constitutional right to counsel in criminal appeals); Trevino
v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (extending recent precedent-establishing a constitutional right
to effective counsel at an initial postconviction proceeding in states that require prisoners to raise claims
of ineffective trial representation in postconviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal-to states
that encourage, without requiring, prisoners to raise ineffective-trial-representation claims in state
postconviction proceedings).
38. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1, at 129 (crediting the Warren Court with creating "a vastly more
humane society, one freer, more equal, and more respectful of the human dignity"); Stevens, supra note
1 (crediting the Warren Court with transforming mid-century police agencies "riddled with
incompetent, lazy, and brutal behavior into a law enforcement profession that is both more effective and
also commands widespread public admiration for its dedicated public service").
39. See Laurie L. Levenson, Searchingfor Injustice. The Challenge ofPostconviction Discovery,
Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 545, 545-51 (2014) (noting the many obstacles that
petitioners in postconviction proceedings currently must surmount in order to protect their interest in a
fair and accurate criminal verdict); Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century
Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated CriminalJustice System, 87 S. CAL L. REV. 633, 638-57 (2014)
(criticizing existing criminal procedure rights governing evidence collection, discovery, presentation of
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interfering with communities' and individuals' ability to govern and protect
themselves.4 0 The left is troubled by evidence that the rules continue to
allow the conviction of innocent defendants41 and systematically
undermine defendants' rights to trial and proportionate punishment.4 2
Those in between worry that the rules are ill-suited to modern
investigations and evidence.4 3 Perhaps the rules' worst enemy is the
evidence, and assistance of counsel, among others, for failing to address the potential for inaccuracy in
new forms of forensic evidence that were not contemplated when the rights were initially recognized);
Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 702-09 (2014)
(criticizing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as inconsistent with a search for
the truth); Dan Simon, Professor of Law and Psychology, Address at the University of Southern
California Law Review Symposium: Goal Displacement: The Diminished Role of Accuracy in the
Criminal Justice Process (June 7, 2013) (describing tensions between procedures designed to ensure due
process and the objective of accurate verdicts).
40. Some commentators claim, for example, that the Miranda rule hampers law enforcement and
public safety. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L.
REv. 421, 427-31 (2003) (arguing that constitutionally protected silence in the face of police
interrogation is frequently the best choice for guilty defendants but not for innocent ones); Paul G.
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1089-91, 1107-13 (1998) (suggesting that
Mirandacaused crime clearance rates to drop); Gordon Van Kessel, Quietingthe Guilty and Acquitting
the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 937-39, 94851, 962-64, 969-72 (2002) (concluding that the expansion of the right to silence has decreased
convictions of both guilty and innocent people).
41.

See, e.g., JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN

JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT xviii (2003) (crediting DNA testing with
"expos[ing] a system of law that has been far too complacent about its fairness and accuracy");
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 7-

8 (2011) ("[A]t a trial, few criminal procedure rules .... regulate accuracy rather than procedure.
[Accuracy] matters are typically committed to the discretion of the trial judge."); DAN SIMON, IN
DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 206-15 (2012) (providing estimates of

the rate of wrongful conviction in the United States); Simon, supra note 39 (citing evidence that false
convictions do occur); Slobogin, supra note 39, at 702-09 (describing conditions under which the
American criminal justice system is prone to convicting the innocent).
42. Professor Stuntz has argued, for example, that by taking criminal process out of the hands of
state legislatures and making criminal trials risky and unpredictable for law enforcement, Warren Court
rules incentivized legislators to lengthen sentences dramatically and incentivized prosecutors to use
abusive practices to induce trial-avoiding pleas, which has led to overcriminalization, overcharging,
oversentencing, racially disparate enforcement of drug laws, a shift in budget dollars from preventing
crime to punishing it, and subordination of substantive to procedural fairness. STUNTZ, supra note 11, at
58, 139, 235-36, 257-64. For contrary views, see Corinna Barrett Lain, CountermajoritarianHero or
Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal ProcedureRevolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361, 1365-66 (2004) (arguing that the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence was less
counter-majoritarian than conventionally thought); Dripps, supra note 11, at 470-75 (criticizing
Stuntz's argument); Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 1056-79 (criticizing Stuntz's historical analysis and
providing alternative explanations for trends Stuntz attributes to the Warren Court).
43. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 721, 743, 756-77 (2007) (documenting
courts' "reluctance to approve the means necessary to effectively inspect second-generation [i.e.,
technologically sophisticated forensic] evidence" for accuracy); Murphy, supra note 39, at 639-45
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Supreme Court itself, which repeatedly signals its ambivalence through
proliferating exceptions that complicate and weaken the law,44 harmlesserror findings, 45 and blind acceptance of government and lower court
explanations for problematic actions.46 The Court has doubts about how
well its inflexible rules "fit" particular cases and about responding to
violation of the rules with "nuclear" remedies that exclude powerful
evidence of guilt. These doubts evidently lead the Court to blink when
asked to affirm that a rule means what it seems to say or to impose the
penalty the rule's violation supposedly triggers.
These concerns are hardly surprising. They reprise the powerful
critique of rule-bound bureaucracy that has led actors in other public- and
private-sector domains to seek alternatives. 7 Because central experts
(criticizing existing evidentiary rules for failing to assure the accurate collection and use of modem
forensic evidence).
44. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 (2009) (allowing states to impeach the
accused with statements made to police informants in violation of the accused's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (declaring exception to Miranda
requirements for statements made in response to "routine booking question[s]"); Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 295-96 (1990) (exempting statements from Miranda rule if made outside the "coercive
atmosphere" characterizing custodial interrogations); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56
(1984) (recognizing exception to Miranda requirements for interrogation seeking information about
possible ongoing public harms); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (declaring
exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for improperly seized evidence used to impeach the
accused); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that federal habeas corpus relief is not
available to enforce a defendant's right to exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (allowing state to use incriminating
statement made after defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, refused to talk to police, and was
interrogated some hours later after new warnings had been given).
45. See, e.g., DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 41, at 222-35 (describing several
convictions involving prosecutorial and police misconduct that were upheld under the harmless error
doctrine, though defendants were later exonerated); GARRETT, supra note 41, at 201 (finding that in 30
percent of the cases of prisoners subsequently exonerated by DNA, appellate judges found that
"mistakes were made" at trial but "relied on harmless error in refusing to reverse [the] conviction").
46. See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992-94 (2013) (per curiam) (requiring federal
courts to exercise extreme deference to state courts in applying a statutory limitation on federal habeas
relief to state-court applications of federal constitutional law that not only are legally erroneous but also
are "unreasonable"); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (requiring deference to trial judges'
acceptance of prosecutors' questionable explanations for using peremptory challenges to strike minority
jurors); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1311-12, 1314 (1994) (claiming
that "j]udges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and repeat offenders all know that police officers lie under
oath .... most often to avoid suppression of evidence and to fabricate probable cause" and blaming
current Fourth Amendment rules and practice for "provid[ing] incentives for police officers to fabricate
testimony");
Peter
Keane,
Why
Cops Lie,
S.F.
CHRON.
(Mar.
15,
2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Why-cops-lie-2388737.php ("The first reason [police
lie under oath] is because they .... know that in a swearing match between a [criminal] defendant and a
police officer, the judge always rules in favor of the officer [even when] it is embarrassingly clear to
everyone ... that the officer is lying under oath.").
47.

See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER K. ANSELL, PRAGMATIST DEMOCRACY: EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING
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cannot predict and specify rules for all imaginable situations, "street-level
bureaucrats"-whether production-line workers, teachers, police officers,
or trial judges-will encounter many situations for which no rule has been
prescribed or in which the prescribed response is risible or
counterproductive. Instead of being guided by central experts, therefore,
the local actors exercise unfettered discretion to adopt strategies for solving
the problems, which often promote the actors' personal values or interests
over those of the company's owners or the voting public. Different actors
will make different choices, destroying uniformity and predictability. And
street-level actors will experience the rules as silly or irrelevant, prompting
disrespect for the rules and the "higher-ups" who imposed them. 48
AS PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 104-05, 131-37 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of achieving hierarchical or
bureaucratic accountability for the outcomes of necessarily decentralized decisionmaking within
administrative agencies); JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 45-47, 166-83 (1990) (describing how bureaucratic control undermines the effectiveness of
public school systems); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13-25, 40-53 (1980) (explaining why public bureaucracies cannot
effectively constrain the inevitable exercise of discretion by field-level employees or evaluate their
success in achieving their agencies' objectives); RUDI VOLTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY
OF WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 83-93 (2008) (cataloguing the deficiencies of bureaucracies that operate
under unpredictable conditions); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE
MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 57-78 (1968) (describing the inability of
police administrators to exercise effective bureaucratic control over line officers in order-maintenance
situations); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 700-06 (2003) (describing the
limitations of "technology-based," or bureaucratic, forms of regulation that mandate a single
mechanism for avoiding regulated harms, no matter what the conditions are under which the solution
applies); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183,
184-205 (2003) (linking the failure of judicial decrees to address the full effects of school segregation
and the uneven funding of schools to the top-down, rules-focused bureaucratic nature of early "publiclaw litigation" verdicts and remedies); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of BureaucraticStructure, in CAN
THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 267-309 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (describing
the ill-effects of bureaucratic governance and allied interest-group politics on decisionmaking by public
agencies); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 56-60, 78-82 (2011) (describing an academic consensus that
bureaucracies cannot meet the demands faced by modern regulatory and social service agencies and
comparing two alternatives, "minimalism" and "democratic experimentalism"); infra Part II.
48. See, e.g., LIPSKY, supra note 47, at 16-25 (describing the demoralizing effect of inflexible
bureaucratic rules on field-level employees of social service agencies who cannot do their job
effectively without exercising a fair degree of discretion in response to the different circumstances in
which their clients find themselves); THEODORE R. SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE: THE DILEMMA OF
THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL 9-21 (4th ed. 2004) (noting the day-to-day difficulties of high school
teachers and their lack of identification with the inflexible prescriptions of central administrators,
including administrators trying their best to improve the instruction of students); WILSON, supra note
47, at 32 ("The individualistic, rule-oriented perspective of the courtroom is at variance with the
situational, order maintenance perspective of the patrolman. The patrolman senses this conflict without
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Neither immediate alternative to these difficulties is attractive. Higherups may adopt doctrines-for example, harmless error-that let themselves
and field-level operatives off the hook from counterproductive rulefollowing. 49 Doing so gives official status to the unfettered, often selfserving discretion that the rules were supposed to avoid. It also makes
uninteresting nonevents out of near-misses-near-disastrous deviations
from desired outcomes, which if properly addressed can motivate and
inform effective precautions. 0 This may create incentives to underenforce
the rules and underachieve their objectives. Alternatively, higher-ups may
fetishize the rules to the point-vividly described by Dan Simon and Laurie
Levenson-that rule-following occurs for its own sake with little concern
for whether it leads to the substantive outcomes to which the rules were
supposed to be a means. Here, the result is to overenforce the rules while
still underachieving their objectives. 5
Public-sector organizations may be especially drawn to rule following
because it supplants what for them is the especially difficult process of
identifying desired substantive outcomes and determining whether they
have been achieved. Defining and measuring the success of for-profit
operations often is easier. Their objectives usually have something to do
with how much money they make, and their owners and managers have at
least intermittently strong incentives to get an answer to that question as
well as at least rudimentary accounting standards that provide a method for
doing so. These conditions are less likely to occur in public-sector activity.
Apart from observing whether the rules were followed, it is difficult to
determine, for example, whether a prosecution, trial, and guilty verdict
identified the real culprit and imposed a penalty with the desireddeontological? utilitarian?-effect. No wonder, then, that criminal justice
actors are disposed to focus on rule-following, not on whether they achieve
the desired result.
quite understanding it and this contributes to his unease at having his judgment tested in the
courtroom.").
49. See Hon. Goodwin Liu, Keynote Address at the University of Southern California Law
Review Symposium: Criminal Law on the Crossroads (June 7, 2013).
50. See infra notes 64, 127, 174 and accompanying text.
51.
See Levenson, supra note 39, at 670-72 (criticizing the strict procedural bars that apply in
the habeas corpus context for favoring finality over accuracy); Simon, supra note 39 (explaining that
the goal of the criminal justice system is due process, not accurate outcomes). See also STUNTZ, supra
note 11, at 79-80, 227-30, 260-65 (arguing that the Warren Court's focus on procedure as opposed to
accuracy "siphon[ed] the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the defendant's guilt"
and gave legislators incentives to avoid procedural protections by criminalizing trivial behavior (e.g.,
possession of small amounts of drugs), increasing punishments, and resisting funding for indigent
defense).
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This Essay urges criminal courts to adopt an increasingly common
strategy for avoiding the problems of rule-based bureaucracy, 52 by
(1) working to establish the conditions just mentioned-a solid, resultsoriented conception of success, a strong motivation to inquire honestly into
whether success has been achieved, and valid measures of whether it has;
then (2) using those tools to evaluate the criminal justice systems'
collective experience and results; and (3) using those findings to adjust
actions and improve results. We argue that the tools needed to implement
this strategy are readily at hand and that the main obstacle to the strategy is
an individualistic or libertarian conception of criminal process that, despite
its intersection with the Criminal Procedure Revolution, is inconsistent
with the broadest extension of the right of defendants, victims, and the
public to accurate assessments of guilt and punishment and can be
relinquished without risking the protections associated with that
Revolution.
Part II describes the recent turn from rule-bound bureaucracy to
rigorous analysis and response to collective experience in many spheres of
activity and the resulting collapse of the distinction between operations and
evaluation-administration and review-in favor of treating operations as
continuous self-evaluation, adjustment, and improvement. Part III offers
reasons why blending operations and evaluation through the systematic
monitoring of results should come easily to courts. Part IV gives three
illustrations of the criminal courts' contrary tendency to resist systematic
self-evaluation. Part V describes data-driven strategies the courts could
adopt. Part VI addresses three objections to such strategies, ultimately
tracing them to a benighted individualistic ideal that it urges criminal
justice actors to abandon.
II. RIGOROUS SELF-EVALUATION AND ADJUSTMENT
The bureaucratic method of regulating activity to minimize harms is to
specify an ameliorative step that every actor must take under preordained
52. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 47, at 5-7, 175-83, 187-96 (describing numerous examples of
public agencies using pragmatic problem-solving approaches in lieu of bureaucratic rule enforcement to
solve public problems); Coglianese & Lazer, supranote 47, at 699-706 (explaining what managementbased regulation is and when it is effective); Sabel & Simon, supra note 47, at 78-82 (providing
examples of more flexible, less rule-based "experimentalist" methods of tackling public problems that
previously had been impervious to bureaucratic solutions); James S. Liebman, Ending the Great School
Wars, EDUC. WEEK (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/12/12/14liebman_
ep.h32.html?tkn-UPLFHjswbhH9%2BVL8j5dHAB4mAufzlKAN%2By2q&cmp-clp-edweek
(explaining how new institutional-learning strategies are being used to improve student results in what
previously were poorly performing, highly bureaucratized public school systems).
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circumstances." For example, the government, or a company with a large
fleet of vehicles, may require all automobiles with internal combustion
engines to have catalytic converters or require vehicles to run on natural
gas or electricity. 54 A municipality or a private condominium's governing
board may mandate that all windows in residences above the ground floor
where children are present have specified window guards. 5 Or, finally, the
Supreme Court or state or local courts may prescribe steps that prosecutors,
defendants, defense counsel, and courts must follow to resolve a felony
charge by guilty plea.56 Such top-down, often intricate, requirements and
arrangements work well when the harms addressed, conditions under which
the harms arise, and regulatory costs are predictable and consistent across
most sites or cases. 57 But in many situations, one or more of those
prerequisites is absent with the result that bureaucratic or technology-based
regulations lead to inefficient over- or underregulation.5 8 Additional
flexibility may be obtained by specifying a desired outcome and letting
regulated actors decide for themselves how to reach or stay short of the
specified level. Examples include limits on pollution emissions, the
controlled allocation of tradable pollution permits, and rewards or
consequences for teachers whose students' rates of improvement on
prescribed tests fall above or below a set level.5 9 Here, too, however,
53. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 47, at 694, 701 (describing and criticizing this form of
bureaucratic, or "technology-based," regulation).
54. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(m), 7522(a) (2006) (requiring cars to have catalytic converters,
requiring state inspection to assure the converters work properly, and limiting steps drivers and repair
shops can take to modify the converters); Coca-Cola Joins the National Clean Fleets Partnership,
COCA-COLA CO. (July 20, 2011), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center/press-releases/cocacola-joins-the-national-clean-fleets-partnership (announcing company's commitment to reducing
packaging weight, adopting "ecofriendly driving practices," and "deploying diesel-electric hybrid
trucks").
55. E.g., N.Y.C. Dep't of Housing Dev. & Pres., Window Guards, NYC.Gov,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/owners/window-guards.shtml
(last visited Feb. 27, 2014)
(describing city law authorizing agents to penalize building owners for failing to install window guards
in apartments with young children).
56. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of
guilty pleas made without express admissions of guilt); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794-97
(1970) (upholding guilty plea entered to avoid the death penalty following an allegedly coerced
confession); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571-72, 581-83 (1968) (invalidating statute
permitting imposition of death penalty only upon defendants who go to trial but not upon those who
plead guilty). See also Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 47, at 694, 701 (describing and criticizing
"technology-based" regulation).
57. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 47, at 705 (explaining why technology-based regulation
is "a viable . .. strategy" only when most regulated "actors have similar operations" and the technology
they use "tends to be stable over time").
58. Id at701,705.
59. See id. at 700-01 (limiting workers' exposure to hazardous chemicals to a specified
maximum level but not specifying the particular technology that regulated firms are required to use to
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inconsistency, unpredictability, and variable costs across time and location
can render the minimum or maximum level inappropriate in many
circumstances, again causing inefficient under- or overregulation. 60
A third approach to regulation is to identify a desired direction of
change and to ask actors to measure, explain, and develop site-specific
plans for improving their outcomes with respect to that goal and to adjust
actions and expectations based on what their own and other sites'
experience reveals is possible.6 ' This regulatory strategy minimizes
inefficient under- and overregulation in two ways. First, it lets regulated
parties customize their remedies to the precise conditions they face.
Second, it lets officials compare the effectiveness of steps taken at similar
sites to reveal effective technologies or targets that can serve as default
solutions pending the results, or as rigorous benchmarks for evaluating the
success, of subsequent rounds of regulatory experimentation. 62
diminish exposure affords firms flexibility in finding "less costly ways to achieve [those] performance
levels"); Paul Krugman, Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 7, 2010),
(discussing
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/1 1/magazine/Il Economy-t.html?pagewanted=all&r-0
how market-based, cap-and-trade initiatives can achieve positive results in lessening climate change);
Eric A. Hanushek, TeacherDeselection, in CREATING ANEW TEACHING PROFESSION 165, 165-78 (Dan

Goldhaber & Jane Hannaway eds., 2010) (proposing that school systems improve student outcomes by
setting minimum levels of improvement in test scores that students are expected to achieve on average
each year and by dismissing teachers whose students repeatedly fail to make the desired gains).
60. See, e.g., EVA L. BAKER ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST. BRIEFING PAPER #278: PROBLEMS WITH
THE USE

OF STUDENT

TEST SCORES

TO

EVALUATE

TEACHERS

5-7

(2010),

available at

www.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf/bp278.pdf (arguing that "approaches to teacher evaluation that rely
heavily on test scores can lead to narrowing and over-simplifying the curriculum, and to misidentifying
both successful and unsuccessful teachers"); Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 47, at 701 (describing
inefficiencies arising from performance-based regulations that require heterogeneous entities to achieve
identical outcomes); Sabel & Simon, supra note 47, at 65-69 (discussing the inflexibility and
ineffectiveness of some "cap and trade" regimes for regulating pollution); Stanley Reed & Mark Scott,
In Europe, Paid Permits for Pollution Are Fizzling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/business/energy-environment/europes-carbon-market-issputtering-as-prices-dive.htmlpagewanted=all (describing the uncertainty and volatility in the political
and real economy affecting European tradable carbon pollution permits, generating concerns that the
carbon-permits regime "is not doing its job [of] pushing polluters to reduce carbon emissions").
61. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 47, at 695-96 (explaining why "plan-based" or
"management-based" approaches to regulation may be less costly and more effective than governmentimposed regulatory standards because "they place responsibility for descisionmaking with those who
possess the most information about risks and potential control methods").
62. See id. at 702-03 (explaining how the flexibility that management-based regulation gives to
firms to adopt solutions customized to their particular situations can result in "reducing the social harms
that motivate regulation in the first place"); James S. Liebman & Charles Sabel, The FederalNo Child
Left Behind Act and the Post-DesegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1708-15
(2003) (discussing "New Accountability" reforms to public education systems under which
administrative and pedagogical "rules are in effect provisional frameworks for action that are corrected"
in light of evidence that they are not effective or that other approaches are more effective); Charles F.
Sabel, Rolling Rule Labor Standards: Why Their Time Has Come, and Why We Should Be Glad of It, in
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This iterative and data-driven strategy has been used in many domains
recently to regulate complex operations internally and externally. Toyota
established a dominant position in the automobile industry by quickly
diagnosing and correcting even the most modest production-line
disruptions. 63 From the start, the Nuclear Navy-and, in the wake of the
Three Mile Island disaster, the United States nuclear power industryachieved exemplary safety records by closely monitoring and broadly
disseminating information about ameliorative steps for major and minor
system and operations failures, near-misses, and inaccurate predictions of
how designs and materials would function in practice.6 4 The commission
investigating the Deepwater Horizon oil spill recommended the same
approach for deep-sea drilling.6 5 By rapidly observing the effects of, then
adjusting, ensembles of steps designed both to exploit and to preserve
environmentally sensitive lands, collaborating developers, ranchers, first
peoples, environmentalists, and public officials have found ways to use
lands productively while protecting endangered species and reducing
conflict.6 6 Counting and comparing relapse events has enabled drug courts
to make better decisions about which probationary offenders and service
providers to continue in their programs.67 The United States Department of
PROTECTING LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: PRESENT AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL

SUPERVISION
257,
264-67
(George
P.
Politakis,
ed.
2007),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ednorm/--normes/documents/publication/wcms087817.pdf (discussing the breakdown of traditional hierarchical
systems of contractual rulemaking and their replacement by relational contracts that establish
"framework goals and a governance mechanism for periodically evaluating emergent, alternative
interpretations of it").
63. See, e.g., STEVEN J. SPEAR, THE HIGH VELOCITY EDGE: How MARKET LEADERS LEVERAGE
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE TO BEAT THE COMPETITION 161-91 (2009) (explaining how Toyota
organized all of its activities to maximize its ability to detect and fix production imperfections
immediately as a way to make its manufacturing operations more efficient than those of other
automakers).
64. See, e.g., JOSEPH REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR
POWER SAFETY AFTER THREE MILE ISLAND 1-7, 91-150 (1994) (discussing the effectiveness of
regulatory mechanisms developed by the nuclear power industry after the Three Mile Island disaster);
SPEAR, supra note 63, at 109-40 (discussing the "nuclear Navy").
65. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 235-41 (2010),
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPOavailable
OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
66. See, e.g., Charles Sabel, Archon Fung & Bradley Karkkainen, Beyond Backyard
Environmentalism: How Communities Are Quietly Refashioning EnvironmentalRegulation, BOS. REV.
(1999), availableat http://environmentalpolicyspring201 1.wiki.usfca.edulfile/view/Beyond+Backyard+
Environmentalism.pdf (discussing how national organizations and environmental agencies encourage
stakeholder participation at the local level in devising and implementing plans to achieve the objectives
of conservation and sustainable development).
67. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 47, at 6, 92 ("[C]ourts have developed criteria to track the
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Justice and private philanthropies have conditioned funding for local
juvenile-justice agencies on data demonstrating the effectiveness of plans
for reducing racial disparities at each stage of the process, identified
effective practices, and reduced juvenile incarceration rates.68 Similarly
iterative and data-attentive steps have limited consumers' exposure to
toxins from the production and distribution of meat and leafy green
vegetables;69 improved the learning outcomes of public school children
from Auckland and Helsinki to New York City; 70 reduced safety incidents
as a strategy for improving the efficiency of aluminum production;
progress of court-sanctioned drug treatment regimens over time, iteratively updating their instructions
to offenders in light of their successes and failures."); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1258, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD ENHANCE
FUTURE PERFORMANCE
MEASURE
REVISION
EFFORTS
9-19
(2011),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586793.pdf (explaining how the Bureau of Justice Assistance iteratively
monitors the effectiveness of federally funded drug courts); Michael Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 858-59, 866-67
(2000) (describing drug court monitoring of defendants' relapse rates to assess and identify needed
improvements in the rehabilitative progress of defendants and the effectiveness of social service
agencies and their individual counselors).
68. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 407-09 (2007)
(describing legislation and implementing procedures by the Department of Justice that require states
receiving federal juvenile justice funds to monitor and take steps to moderate racial disparities at key
junctures in the juvenile justice process); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing
Regimes: Institutionalizationas a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1285-91 (2012) (similar).
69. Sabel & Simon, supra note 68, at 1278-85.
70. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., NEW YORK CITY'S STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING
HIGH SCHOOLS:
AN
OVERVIEW
1-11
(2010),
available at http://all4ed.org/wpcontent/uploads/NYCOverviewJan20l0.pdf (detailing the New York City school reforms); PAUL HILL
& CHRISTINE CAMPBELL, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., GROWING NUMBER OF DISTRICTS SEEK
BOLD
CHANGE
WITH
PORTFOLIO
STRATEGY
(2011),
available
at
http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/GrowingNumberofDistrictsSeekBoldChangeWith
PortfolioStrategyJune201_.pdf (describing "portfolio strategies" for school reform being
implemented in a number of districts across the nation); HELEN F. LADD, EDUCATION INSPECTORATE
SYSTEMS IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE NETHERLANDS: A POLICY NOTE (2009), available at
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdfl?cote=EDU/EDPC/INES/NESLI%28200
9%296&docLanguage=En (describing school reforms in New Zealand); CHARLES SABEL ET AL.,
INDIVIDUALIZED SERVICE PROVISION IN THE NEW WELFARE STATE: LESSONS FROM SPECIAL
EDUCATION
IN
FINLAND
5-8,
20-54
(2010),
available
at
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-anno/Papers/individualizedservice_provision.pdf
(describing the
institutional-learning strategies Finland has used to improve education outcomes there more rapidly
than in other nations); HEATHER ZAVADSKY, BRINGING SCHOOL REFORM TO SCALE 15-64 (2009)
(discussing school reforms in Aldine, Texas); Stacey Childress et al., Managingfor Results at the New
York City Department of Education, in EDUCATION REFORM INNEW YORK CITY: AMBITIOUS CHANGE
IN THE NATION'S MOST COMPLEX SCHOOL SYSTEM 87, 87-108 (Jennifer A. O'Day et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing school reforms in New York City); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 47, at 216-65 (discussing
school reforms in Texas and Kentucky).
71. See, e.g., SPEAR, supra note 63, at 88-108 (describing major aluminum manufacturer
Alcoa's monitoring and immediate implementation of local solutions for every harmful accident and
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enhanced the autonomy and comfort of nursing home residents in
Australia 72 and the stability of in-home and foster placements for abused
and neglected children in Alabama and Utah;73 provided disciplining and
trust-building devices for producer-supplier and inter-divisional partners in
the design of computers, jet engines, and large farm equipment when
contractual price and quantity terms are unavailable for those purposes; 74
helped urban police forces deploy law-enforcement resources where they
are most needed;7 5 and identified tuna-fishing methods that are least likely
to harm dolphins.7 6
All these endeavors put carefully observed collective experience ever
more systematically and effectively at the service of future improvement.
Typically, organizations mine "Big Data" for patterns of error in more and
more precisely defined sets of circumstances in search of predictive and
diagnostic information about how to adjust operations to reduce error, then
collect more data on the effect of each adjustment to allow still swifter and
near-miss and sharing of solutions with other factories as a way to improve safety and productivity).
72. See generally John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules
Versus Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 307 (1995) (studying how
different ways of formulating and monitoring compliance with rules and standards has affected nursing
home quality of life in Australia and the United States).
73. See, e.g., Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in
the Service-Based Welfare System: Lessonsfrom Child Welfare Reform, 34 L. & SOC. INQ. 523, 533-64
(2009) (describing new ways of institutional learning through the qualitative and quantitative
monitoring of individual and aggregate outcomes of child welfare services to families in crisis).
74. See, e.g., SPEAR, supra note 63 at 140-48 (discussing innovative methods of designing jet
engines); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contractingfor Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 458-71 (2009) (discussing
innovative contracting arrangements used by Apple, John Deere, and Warner-Lambert Co.).
75. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 47, at 47-54, 108-15 (discussing CompStat and community
policing); JOHN BUNTIN, HARVARD UNIV. KENNEDY SCH. Gov., ASSERTIVE POLICING, PLUMMETING
CRIME: THE NYPD TAKES ON CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY, CASE PROGRAM C16-99-1530.0 (1999)
(discussing implementation of CompStat in New York City); COLLEEN MCCUE, DATA MINING AND
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND CRIME ANALYSIS 203-05 (2007) (discussing
automated classification techniques used to facilitate investigations of drug-related crimes); ARCHON
FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 173-97 (2004) (discussing
community policing in Chicago); Tina Rosenberg, Armed with Data,Fighting More than Crime, N.Y.
TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 2, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/
armed-with-data-fighting-more-than-crime/?_r-0 (discussing implementation of CompStat and CitiStat
in Baltimore); Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuitof Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June 19,
http:/Ibits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-crime/? r-O
2013),
("At the Seattle Police Department, the morning roll call begins with Google Maps and computer
algorithms," and police use the results of "software that crunches crime data and tries to predict where
crimes are most likely to occur over the next few hours.").
76. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 68, at 1292-97 (explaining why the monitoring of steps
tuna-fishing operations chose to reduce dolphin mortality under a general international mandate worked
better than command-and-control regulation).
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more targeted correction and fine-tuning.77 As the New York Times
reported recently, "The story is the same in one field after another, in
science, politics, crime prevention, public health, sports and industries as
varied as energy and advertising. All are being transformed by data-driven
discovery and decision-making"7 8 based on "analysis rather than
experience and intuition-more science and less gut feel." 7 1
Evidence that the courts' rule-based regulation of criminal justice is
failing80 puts criminal justice at the same crossroads these other operations
traversed when deciding to supplant bureaucracy with data-driven selfreflection and adjustment. Below we encourage the courts to take the same
path. Because doing so jettisons the distinction between operations and
quality control in favor of rigorously measuring ongoing operations to
assure quality during, not after, the fact,8 ' we first address a threshold
objection: that the separation of powers requires courts to preserve the
distinction between operations (for which the executive and administrators
are presumptively responsible) and after-the-fact quality control (the work
of the courts).
III. THE COURTS' SIMULTANEOUSLY OPERATIONAL AND
REGULATORY ROLE IN CRIMINAL CASES
It might seem that the responsibility for the self-regulatory steps
described above falls more naturally on and that the separation of powers
77. Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, Broadening Beyond the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2013, 11:09 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/sizing-up-big-data-broadening-beyond-theinternet/ ("Big Data ... means three things. First, it is a bundle of technologies. Second, it is a potential
revolution in measurement. And third, it is a point of view or philosophy about how
decisions .. . should be . . . made.").
78. Id.

79. Id. The headlines of articles in the Times' special section on Big Data are illustrative: Ken
Belson, Digitizing Sports to Slake a Thirst for Stats, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013, 9:32 PM),
Stephanie
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/digitizing-sports-to-slake-a-thirst-for-stats/;
Clifford, Using Data to Stage-Manage Paths to the PrescriptionCounter, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013,
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/using-data-to-stage-manage-paths-to-the10:12
prescription-counter/; Micah Cohen, From Campaign War Room to Big-DataBroom, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2013, at F4 (subtitled "Studying social media and buying habits to paint a fuller picture [of potential
voters and donors]"); Quentin Hardy, G.E. Makes the Machine, and Then Listens to It, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2013, at F14 (subtitled "Sensors track how wind turbines, generators, and locomotives
perform"); Amy O'Leary, In New Tools to Combat Epidemics, the Key Is Context, N.Y. TIMES (June
19, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-new-tools-to-combat-epidemics-thekey-is-context/; Nick Wingfield, Gauging the Natural,and Digital,Rhythms ofLife, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2013, at F15 (subtitled "Recording workouts, vital signs, phone calls and e-mail").
80. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g, SPEAR, supra note 63, at 155-91 (discussing Toyota's self-conscious monitoring
and continuous improvements of operations).
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assigns them exclusively to police departments, forensic laboratories,
prosecuting offices, and public defense organizations, and not the courts.
Although we hope those actors take such steps-as many already do in
contexts not regulated by the courts 82 -giving them sole responsibility is
misguided. As noted, the courts minutely govern large swaths of the
administration of criminal justice.83 Law enforcement agencies are unlikely
to innovate freely in those contexts, therefore, absent the courts' exemption
from those rules, endorsement of rigorous evidence-based action, and
instructive example.
One might expect courts to be sympathetic to using the results of their
actions to improve the administration of justice. In part, this is because
judicial review in the criminal justice context differs from that in other
domains. If, in Robert Cover's terms, what courts do in constitutional
regimes is review and constrain the "violence" that government actors
inflict on people and communities by limiting their freedom to make
meaning out of their lives, 84 then the violence courts review in the criminal
context-prosecuting, trying, imprisoning, and executing people and
sometimes letting known and violent criminals escape punishment-is
different, because the violence is substantially the courts' own. 85 Criminal
courts often, therefore, simultaneously administer and regulate violence, so
routinely using regulatory learning to improve administration should seem
obvious and natural.
The role of appellate courts in death penalty cases is a stark example.
Nearly all states forbid capital verdicts to be carried out until they are
affirmed by the state high court on direct review, whether or not the
convicted defendant opts to appeal. 6 The appellate court's role, thus, is
82. See supra notes 67-68, 75 (discussing data-driven techniques police, prosecuting offices, and
courts use to fight crime, handle drug offenders, and minimize racial disparities in juvenile justice);
Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 107-47 (2001)
(discussing similar techniques for combatting racial profiling while improving law enforcement).
83. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
84. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 40, 47-48, 53-56 (1983)
(discussing the choice judges face when reviewing coercive state action between affirming norms
permitting coercion or permitting contrary legal understandings to alter social practice and control). See
also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622-28 (1986) (extending the
analysis of violence and judicial decisionmaking to judicial review of capital punishment).
85. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 95-98, 105-11 (2007) (explaining the Supreme
Court's inability to forgo regulating the death penalty, despite powerful reasons to defer to the political
branches, given its own role and that of the courts it superintends in administering that form of state
violence).
86. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 173-74, 174 n.l (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[A]lmost all of the 37 [s]tates with the death penalty apparently have prescribed mandatory,
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both to exercise quality control over the trial court's product and to add
something essential of its own. Rulings on stays of execution are similar.
An essential step on the way to an execution is the telephonic "go-ahead"
from the state high court and the United States Supreme Court.
Technically, of course, the courts are refusing to stay a process otherwise
outside their control. But that process is the execution of a court order;
from the warden's and public's perspective, the phone call is necessary to
deliver a superior court's okay to execute the order and take the prisoner's
life.17
The same principle holds for the most mundane acts of criminal
judges. Much of what judges do in the process of preparing for and
conducting criminal trials and appeals is to decide whether to admit or
exclude evidence. These acts are not just administrative steps to resolve the
dispute before the court, but also regulatory steps to influence the conduct
of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower courts in future cases.
This fact is explicit when courts administer the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment exclusionary rule with a focus not on the outcome of the case
at hand but on the future behavior of police officers and on assuring that
judges do not become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of [the]
Constitution."" Conversely, rulings admitting evidence obtained through
police searches and interrogations that are unsuccessfully challenged as
unconstitutional not only put evidence before the trier of fact but also invite
the continuation of the challenged practices. Mapp, however, did not invent
the regulatory role of evidentiary rulings. It simply adapted that tool to the
enforcement of constitutional rights. Every criminal trial and appellate
judge recognizes, therefore, that most actions they take are simultaneously
administrative or dispute resolving with respect to the case at hand and
regulatory with respect to the ongoing collection, preservation, and
presentation of evidence in criminal cases generally. Actors in the criminal
justice system-judges included-are expected to learn something from
each ruling about how future cases should be handled.
Nor would one expect American courts to resist learning from the
aggregate trend of their own and other courts' rulings or from the run of
nonwaivable appellate review of at least the sentence in capital cases.").
87. See Liebman, supra note 85, at 97 ("[T]he medium for giving the final order to kill-the
court's telephone call to the warden announcing the denial or lifting of a stay-dramatically 'renders
the execution constitutional violence' by showing the violence to be the judge's, not the
executioner's.").
88. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (explaining the "sanction of exclusion" of evidence as both an "assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures" and a way to avoid judicial complicity in improper police behavior).
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actions by police, prosecutors, and defense counsel in cases similar to the
one at hand. Pattern-focused analysis of an aggregation of instances is, after
all, the essence of the common law method89 and of courts' reliance on
standard commercial, professional, and community practices to resolve a
myriad of cases. 90
IV. JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO DATA-DRIVEN SELFREGULATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
As this part's discussion of three criminal law curiosities illustrates,
however, American criminal courts viscerally resist the aggregative, selfregulative analysis of their own and other criminal-justice players' results
despite strong evidence of the value of such analysis. Courts have
eschewed pattern-focused review of death sentences, ignored error rates in
capital cases, and discounted the summed effect of match and non-match
evidence of the identity of criminals.
A. (NON)REVIEW OF DEATH-SENTENCING PATTERNS

If asked to name the Supreme Court's lodestar death penalty case, any
expert will probably cite Furman v. Georgia, which in 1972 overturned
every capital-sentencing statute in the nation as excessively discretionary.9 1
This is itself an oddity. Furman's outcome was premised on five separate
and conflicting opinions, none joined by more than a single Justice. 92 In the
three opinions most often used to navigate the Court's jurisprudence,
Justice White concluded that there were too few death sentences to provide
a deterrence or retribution, Justice Stewart reasoned that death sentences
were too many and too capriciously distributed to signify the worst of the
worst, and Justice Douglas ignored the proportion of crimes ending in
death verdicts and focused on the verdicts' misdistribution between, for
89.

See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, LEGAL METHODS: UNDERSTANDING AND USING CASES AND

STATUTES 5 (2005) (defining the common law as an authoritative body of law that "draws its force
from" reasoned explanations of conclusions reached "in relation to the existing body of decisions").
90. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (using "contemporary community
standards" to determine whether sexually explicit materials fall within the "obscenity" exception to
First Amendment protection); Morisch v. United States, 653 F.3d 522, 531 (7th Cir. 2011) (requiring
malpractice plaintiff to show that the medical practitioner failed to exercise the standard of care
common in the relevant medical community).
91. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1973) (per curiam). For recent expressions of Furman's
canonical status, see, for example, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419,422 (2008).
92. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J. concurring); id. at
240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
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example, African American and white defendants. 93
The only respect in which the three opinions agree is their
decisionmaking method. Each Justice based his conclusions on an
evaluation of aggregate death-sentencing patterns observed over years. As
Justice White explained, for example: "I can do no more than state a
conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and
circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases
involving crimes for which death is . . . authorized . . .. that the death

penalty is exacted with great infrequency ... and that there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not."94
Four years later in Gregg v. Georgia, as states struggled to develop
death-sentencing procedures that satisfied Furman, the Court upheld
Georgia's new statute, pointing the way for other States." The Court
approvingly noted that the Georgia Legislature had taken the Court's
pattern-focused methodology to heart and required the state supreme court
to conduct comparative "proportionality review" of every death sentence. 96
Such review "inquire[s] . . . whether the penalty is . . . unacceptable in a

particular case because [it is] disproportionate to the punishment imposed
on others convicted of the same crime." 97 Trial judges were required to file
reports on every case in which death was a potential penalty with
comprehensive data on the crime, offender, victim, and verdicts so the state
supreme court could determine whether death sentences were consistently
imposed in cases similar to the one under review.98 The Supreme Court
lauded Georgia's aggregative analysis "as a check against the random or
arbitrary

imposition

of the

death penalty. . . . [which]

substantially

eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the
action of an aberrant jury." 99 Many states emulated Georgia's comparative
93. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring). This analysis is developed further in Liebman, supra
note 85, at 7-14; James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better, Justice Stevens and the
NarrowedDeath Penalty, 74 FORD. L. REv. 1607, 1612-48 (2006).
94. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
95. GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (West 2006) (requiring Georgia Supreme Court to
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
96. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-06.
97. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,43 (1984).
98. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166-68 (discussing GA. CODE. ANN. § 27-2537, superseded in 2006 by
the identical GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3)).
99. Id. at 206.
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proportionality provisions,' 00 and when the Georgia statute again came
under constitutional attack in 1983, the Court again emphasized the
importance of comparative review to the statute's constitutionality. 0 '
Starting in 1984, however, the Court gradually turned against the
aggregative methodology that is the only unifying feature of Furman's
lodestar opinions. In Pulley v. Harris,the Court ruled that the Constitution
did not require capital states to conduct comparative proportionality
review. 102 Three years later, Warren McCleskey, a black man sentenced to
die for killing a white police officer in a robbery, presented a study of
hundreds of attributes of the crime, offender, victim, and courts in all
potentially capital murder cases processed under Georgia's deathsentencing procedures. Controlling for those factors, the study showed that
the state was 4.3 times more likely to sentence a defendant to death for
killing a white victim than a black victim.103 Accepting the study as
statistically valid-it of course was infinitely more informative than the
unrefined data on which the Justices had relied in Furman-theCourt ruled
the pattern evidence irrelevant.1 04 Apart from evidence linking a particular
prosecutor, judge, or juror to one or more identifiable and consequential
acts of racial discrimination, the Court ruled, a capital defendant could not
constitutionally challenge the death penalty based on a state's racially
identifiable death-sentencing patterns. 0 5
Finally, in a series of cases culminating in Arave v. Creech,106 the
Court held that it would no longer examine the pattern of a state's
applications of any particular capital aggravating factor to determine
whether the factor satisfied the Eighth Amendment requirement that it
narrow the category of death-eligible killings to something short of all firstdegree murders. 0 7 If the state courts gave the factor a narrowing definition,
100.

See Leigh B. Bienen, The ProportionalityReview of Capital Cases by State High Courts

After Gregg: Only "The AppearanceofJustice," 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 222-62 (1996)

(summarizing each state's use of proportionality review); Liebman, supra note 85, at 116-17
(discussing New Jersey's elaborate system of comparative proportionality review of capital cases).
101. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (requiring comparative review of capital
verdicts); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983) (affirming capital statute in part because of an
"important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence by the Georgia
Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality").
102. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43-44.
103. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987).
104.

Id. at 291 n.7, 313.

105. Id. at 292.
106. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
107. Id. at 476-77 (declining review of "whether state courts properly have applied an aggravating
circumstance" as opposed to "whether the circumstance, as narrowed, is facially valid." (citing Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 778-80 (1990)).
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the Court would not consider whether the application of that definition in
the run of cases in fact confined death sentences to less than all first-degree
murders.o 8 The Court then upheld Idaho's "cold, calculated killing" factor
as sufficiently narrower than "premeditated and deliberate" first-degree
murder.10 9
Curiously, therefore, although Furman remains the lodestar for
determining the constitutionality of death-sentencing procedures under the
Eighth Amendment, no court today could replicate that decision's analysis
or conclusion in a case presenting the same statewide death-sentencing
0
patterns as those before the Court in Furman."1
B. (IN)ATTENTION TO RATES OF ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES
A second curiosity also relates to the death penalty. In 2000 and 2002,
this Essay's senior author and colleagues issued a two-part study of the
outcomes of all 4578 state direct appeals, 248 state postconviction
reversals, and 599 capital federal habeas cases in which a final judgment
was reached upon review of a capital verdict between 1973 and 1995.1'
We found that over two-thirds of all death verdicts fully reviewed during
the period were reversed due to serious legal error,' 12 with elected state
judges responsible for 90 percent of the more than 1800 reversals.113 In
identifying conditions associated with especially high error rates in states
108. Liebman, supra note 85, at 63-64.
109. Arave, 507 U.S. at 475-76.
110. Liebman, supra note 85, at 121-22. For another example of the Court's more recent rejection
of systematic analysis it previously deemed essential, compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US 510,
517-18 (1968) (deferring a ruling on the constitutionality of excluding prospective capital jurors from
deciding guilt or innocence because they are unwilling to impose a death sentence until additional social
scientific evidence revealed the impact across cases of such exclusions on the fairness and accuracy of
guilt-innocence determinations), with Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (acknowledging
an array of new studies indicating that "death-qualified" juries are substantially more prone to convict
than other juries, but ruling the studies irrelevant and limiting the constitutional question to whether any
juror in the particular case was individually biased against the defendant).

111.

JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES

IN
CAPITAL
CASES,
1973-1995,
at
i-iv
(2000),
available
at
http://www2.law.columbia.edulinstructionalservicesliebman/; JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN
SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE

ABOUT IT, at i-vi (2002), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/

[hereinafter

LIEBMAN ET AL., BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II]; Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent

Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 214,
222, 260-61 (2004); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in CapitalCases, 19731995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839, 1846-60 (2000).
112. Gelman et al., supra note 111, at 215-17.
113. See id. at 222 (finding that state courts staffed by elected judges were responsible for 90
percent of the reversals of death verdicts); id. at 218-23 (concluding that nearly all the reversals were
for errors undermining the accuracy of the verdict).
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and counties, we discovered that jurisdictions imposing the highest
proportion of capital sentences relative to crimes and convictions were also
the most likely to infuse any given death sentence with error.114 Holding
other factors equal, the probability that a death verdict would be overturned
was seven times higher in states and counties with the highest capitalsentencing rates than those with the lowest."'
At the same time, states most likely to impose death for a given crime
were seven times less likely to capture, convict, and incarcerate criminals
than the least death-prone capital states and spent only a third as much on
their criminal courts.1 1 6 In effect, high-death-sentencing jurisdictions use
the death penalty as a cheap and dirty alternative to systematic law
enforcement and to the reliable prosecution of criminal cases-explaining
why use of capital punishment is strongly associated with serious error but
not with lower crime rates. 1 17
Curiously, this boring bean-counting aggregation of appellate
outcomes was a lead story in hundreds of newspapers and news programs
nationwide." 8 Because courts do not aggregate even the most routine
information about the reliability of their own verdicts in the most
consequential of cases, it is big news when someone else does. Courts'
failure to compare the frequency with which different jurisdictions' capital
or other verdicts are found to be seriously flawed leaves them unaware of
vast discrepancies in the probability of error from one jurisdiction to the
next and unable, for example, to raise the level of scrutiny applied in
reviewing verdicts from jurisdictions with a demonstrably poor track record
or to impose stricter sanctions when patterns of error persist.' 19
The criminal justice system does not even use readily available data to
measure the errors we most care about: execution of the innocent.' 2 0 State
114.
LIEBMAN ET AL., BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II, supra note 111, at 352-53.
115.
Id.; Gelman et al., supranote 111, at 241; Liebman & Clarke, supranote 5, at 267-68.
116.
Gelman et al., supranote 111, at 242-43.
117.
Liebman & Clarke, supranote 5, at 273-77, 322-23.
118.
See COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, A BROKEN SYSTEM PART II: NEWS COVERAGE AS OF MARCH
7, 2002 (2002) (on file with author) (collecting reprints and transcripts of the wide media coverage of A
BROKEN SYSTEM PART II); FENTON MEDIA COVERAGE, MEDIA COVERAGE REPORT ON JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN &VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES
1973-1995 (2000) (on file with author) (collecting reprints and transcripts ofthe wide media coverage
of A BROKEN SYSTEM); CAMPAIGN FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, MEDIA COVERAGE REPORT AND
CLIP PACK, A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, FEBRUARY 11-MARCH 18, 2002 (2002) (on file with author)
(collecting reprints and transcripts of the wide media coverage of A BROKEN SYSTEM PART II).
119.
Gelman et al., supra note 111, at 224.
120.
For non-DNA evidence that American jurisdictions have executed innocent prisoners over
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forensic labs and police lockers nationwide contain physical evidence with
the never-tested DNA of the perpetrators of hundreds of capital crimes for
which men and women have been executed since 1976.121 But freedom-ofinformation laws do not apply, and courts and law enforcement agencies
have declined to conduct DNA tests or allow others to do so in all but three
cases--one of which confirmed guilt,122 another of which was
inconclusive, 123 and the most recent of which pointed to innocence. 124
Unlike other big operations that risk "innocent" life, that is, courts and law
enforcement agencies remain utterly uninformed about what their own data
show about their rates of risking and taking the lives of innocent people. 125
the last quarter century, see, for example, James S. Liebman et al., Los Tocayos Carlos, 43 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 711, 1103-04 (2012) (reconstructing the process through which Texas executed
Carlos DeLuna for a crime to which another man repeatedly confessed and very probably committed);
Raymond Bonner & Sara Rimer, A Closer Look at Five Cases That Resulted in Executions of Texas
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2000), http://partners.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/051400whbush-cases.html?scp-l&sq-%22david%20spence%22&st-cse (reporting that two of six jailhouse
informants who testified against David Spence at his capital trial recanted their stories since he was
executed in 2000 and that experts studying bite marks used as evidence against Spence concluded that
the marks do not match Spence's teeth); Terry Ganey, After Execution, Case Is Reopened, ST. LOUIs
POST-DISPATCH (July 12, 2005), http://business.highbeam.com/435553/article-lGI-133964265/afterexecution-case-reopened (reporting that the critical witness who identified executed inmate Larry
Griffin as the perpetrator of a street shooting had not been at the crime scene and that a man who was
present but did not testify at trial knew Griffin and was sure he was not one of the shooters); David
Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa-fact grann (casting doubt on evidence used
to conclude that a house fire that killed Cameron Todd Willingham's daughters was intentionally set,
rather than accidental and exposing the scientifically unsound methods used to conclude that the fire
was set intentionally); Lise Olsen, Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, Hous. CHRON. (Nov. 20,
2005), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/3472872.html (raising doubts about the execution of
Ruben Cantu, who was implicated by a single eyewitness who has since recanted his claim that Cantu
was the killer and presenting a sworn statement by Cantu's codefendant, who was convicted but not
executed for the crime, that Cantu was not involved).
121. Murphy, supra note 39, at 645-52.
122. See Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Executed Man, WASH.
POST (Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/12/
AR2006011201210.html (discussing postexecution DNA tests confirming guilt of Roger Keith
Coleman, who was executed by Virginia in 1992).
123. See Tests Inconclusive in Murder Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 12, 2000),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2000/Tests-Inconclusive-in-Murder-Case/ide9a2e62144737050cb8e7edf524ca781 (reporting results of DNA tests arranged by news organizations
after the execution of Ellis Wayne Felker, which found that tests comparing Felker's DNA to that in
fingernail scrapings from the victim were "inconclusive").
124. See Dave Mann, DNA Tests Undermine Evidence in Texas Execution, TEX. OBSERVER (Nov.
11, 2010), http://www.texasobserver.org/cover-story/texas-observer-exclusive-dna-tests-undermineevidence-in-texas-execution (reporting results of postexecution DNA testing revealing that a hair found
at a robbery-murder crime scene-which was described at Claude Jones's trial as "matching" his hair
based on since-discredited microscopic hair analysis and which provided the main evidence that Jones
was the killer-was not Jones's hair).
125. Cf Wayne A. Ray et al., Azithromycin and the Risk of CardiovascularDeath, 366 NEW ENG.
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C. (DIs)COUNTING MATCH AND NON-MATCH EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

Many modem operations collect and adjust strategies based on
systematically analyzed information about their own collective
experience. 12 6 These analyses focus not only on large system failures but
also on minor errors and "near misses,"1 27 which can serve as canaries in
the mine, signaling impending disasters. Because courts and other criminal
justice actors rarely conduct such analyses, the best information we have
comes from media and academic studies of prisoners exonerated by DNA
or otherwise' 28 and occasional inquiries by law enforcement agencies into
how innocent men and women became lead suspects or were convicted.129
Commentators' main focus in discussing these exonerations and
reinvestigations is the mishandling of what might be called "big" evidence:
confessions, eyewitness identifications, jailhouse informant testimony,
fingerprints, and other evidence that exerts a major influence on jurors.130
When DNA testing or confessions expose the actual offender,
exonerations and reinvestigations also, however, highlight the mishandling
of a kind of "small" evidence, which actually pointed to innocence from the
J. MED. 1881 (2012), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa1003833 (describing a
study approved by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare and Department of Health that addresses the
heart-related risks associated with the antibiotic Azithromycin); Peter Lattman & Natasha Singer, Army
2012),
(Feb.
2,
TIMES
N.Y.
After
Deaths,
Supplements
Workout
Studies
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/business/army-studies-workout-supplements-after-2deaths.html?pagewanted=all (describing the United States Army's study of workout supplements after
dimethylamylamine, a controversial workout supplement ingredient, was included in the toxicology
reports of two soldiers who died while working out); Andrew Martin, Consumer Agency Tightens
2011),
31,
(Jan.
N.Y.
TIMES
Products,
Sleep
of
Baby
Scrutiny
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/business/0l safety.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the Consumer
Product Safety Commission's ban on drop-side baby cribs after studying fatalities linked to them and
noting safety studies the commission is conducting on other baby products).
126. See supranotes 62-76.
127. For examples of operations that monitor minor incidents and/or near-misses for information
about disaster-in-the-making, see sources cited supranotes 50, 63-64, 71 and infra note 174.
128. See, e.g., supra notes 41, 117-20 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Non-Matches as
Evidence ofInnocence, 98 IOwA L. REV. 577, 647-48 (2013) (discussing FBI inquiry into how it falsely
concluded that Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield was responsible for a terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain,
based on faulty fingerprint analysis); Henry Lee, How Innocent Man's DNA Was Found at Killing
Scene, SFGATE (June 26, 2013, 11:07 PM), http://www.sfgate.condefault/article/How-innocent-mans-DNA-was-found-at-killing-scene-462497 1.php (describing arrest of Lukis Anderson based on match
between his DNA and fingernail scrapings from the murder victim, followed by his release five months
later because of incontrovertible proof that he was drunk and unconscious in a hospital when the killing
occurred and discovery that the same paramedics who transported Anderson to the hospital also moved
the body of the murder victim hours later).
130. Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 583-84.
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start but was ignored. 13' These are traces found at the crime scene by police
that were ignored because they did not match the defendant but later
proved to be relevant because they do match the real culprit. 3 2 For
example, a reinvestigation of Texas's 1989 execution of Carlos DeLuna for
a crime a lookalike named Carlos Hernandez almost certainly committed,
documented not only a likely mistaken, "big" cross-ethnic identification of
DeLuna made under intensely suggestive circumstances, but also, buried in
police reports and photos, twenty-two "small" markers potentially pointing
to the culprit that were ignored because they did not match Carlos
DeLuna.' 33 What the jury never knew, because it never learned of Carlos
Hernandez's existence, is that ten of those features matched Hernandez. So
did all seven additional bits of small evidence in the case that were
emphasized at trial because they matched DeLuna. None of the twenty-nine
features matched DeLuna but not Hernandez.1 34
We call this kind of evidence, which is present in most identity cases,
"non-exclusionary non-matches." 35 It includes any trace that may or may
not have been left behind or taken from the scene by the culprit and does
not match the defendant.136 An example is a fingerprint on a convenience
store counter that matches neither the robbery suspect nor the store's
employees. The "non-matching" fingerprint is "non-exclusionary" because
it does not rule out the suspect: the culprit may have left the print (in which
case the suspect in a single-perpetrator crime is innocent), or the print may
131.
Id. at 580-81.
132. For examples, see id. at 580-87.
133. Id. at 585-87. Hernandez repeatedly confessed to family and friends that he, not his lookalike Carlos DeLuna, committed the crime. See Liebman et al., supra note 120, at 876-83.
134. Three of the twenty-nine clues matched neither DeLuna nor Hernandez, and nine were never
tested to determine whom they matched. Liebman et al, supra note 129, at 585-86.
Our count of twenty-nine matchable features actually should be considerably higher. This is
because, after being stabbed with a large buck knife, the victim struggled with the assailant as she bled
to death, drenching the four-foot by six-foot crime scene in pools, drops and spatters of blood. None of
the blood was collected or tested because the police assumed it all was the victim's. Had police
collected and tested all the blood traces-greatly increasing the count of matchable clues at the crime
scene-one or more of them might have conclusively identified the killer. For a case in which the
belated analysis of blood evidence had exactly this effect and may lead to an exoneration, see Lizette
Alvarez, Lawyers Say DNA Clears Florida Inmate in Two Killings, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/lawyers-say-dna-clears-florida-inmate-in-killings.html?_r-0
(reporting that a DNA analysis of blood spatter collected at a crime scene seven years earlier revealed
that, although none of the blood came from a man who spent seven years on death row for the crime
and most of the blood was from the victims, some of the blood belonged to a mentally disturbed relative
of the victims with a history of animosity toward the victims).
135. Liebman et al., supranote 129, at 584-85.
136. Id. at 585.
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have been innocently left by a customer.' 37 Other examples include features
of the offender remembered or misremembered by eyewitnesses that do not
match the suspect (age, height, eye color, clothing, cigarette brand, facial
tick), detritus found at but foreign to the crime scene that the culprit may or
may not have left behind (a button, soil, carpet fiber, or animal hair), or
similar items that are native to the crime scene and may or may not have
been intentionally or accidentally carried off by the culprit.'38
A single non-exclusionary non-match often is unimpressive because
of the high probability that it has nothing to say about who committed the
crime. 139 But when Bayes' Theorem is used to measure their aggregate
effect, multiple non-exclusionary non-matches can easily add up to a
reasonable doubt. 140 Assuming independence, 14 1 Bayes' Theorem
calculates the impact of a new piece of information on the preexisting odds
by multiplying those odds times a "likelihood ratio" associated with the
new evidence.' 42 The likelihood ratio is a mathematical statement of the
new information's probative weight.143 For instance, given a low
probability of contracting an infectious disease (say, one-half of 1 percent,
meaning the prior odds of infection are one to 199), Bayes' Theorem
explains why even if you test positive for the disease using a 99-percentaccurate test, the odds are only one-to-two that you are actually infected (or
two-to-one that you are not infected):
prior odds
x ~~~pro
probabity
you
wouldtest
test
positive
infected
subsequent odds
priorof infection
bability you
eould
positive
if if
not
Infected
dsoof infection
neta
1 con
-sbeun

1
1
99 X 0.01

1
1.9-9 or 33% (odds restated as a probability)

In a recent article, we develop a stylized example of the potential
effect of multiple non-exclusionary non-matches. 4 4 We imagine a jury 98
percent certain of the defendant's guilt after hearing that an eyewitness
identified the defendant and learning that the tops of the robbery-murder
victim's nylon stockings were missing and that police found several
knotted stocking tops in the suspect's dresser when they arrested him.
137. Id. at 584-85.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 610.
140. Id. at 587-88.
141. See infra notes 155-57and accompanying text.
142. Liebman et al., supranote 129, at 593. Applied to evidence of identity, the likelihood ratio is
the probability that the new evidence would be present if the defendant were guilty divided by the
probability that the same evidence would be present if the defendant were not guilty.
143. Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1022-25 (1977).
144. See Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 588-97 (using a hypothetical example to demonstrate
the value of multiple non-exclusionary non-matches as evidence capable of establishing a reasonable
doubt about guilt).
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Using Bayes' Theorem, we then estimate the impact of five nonexclusionary non-matches: (1) a police investigator's initial theory that a
left-handed assailant delivered the fatal blows, though the defendant is
right-handed, reduces the 98 percent prior probability of guilt to 94.1
percent; (2) a neighbor's description of a short balding man seen near the
victim's home just before the offense, though the defendant is taller and has
a full head of hair, further reduces the guilt probability to 93.7 percent; (3)
a pedestrian's testimony that she was nearly knocked over by a blue-eyed
man running in the opposite direction from the crime scene after the crime
occurred, though the defendant has brown eyes, reduces the probability to
88.1 percent; (4) an unsmoked cigarette found at the crime scene, though
neither the victim nor the defendant smokes, reduces the probability to 83.2
percent; and (5) the eyewitness's description to police of a brown
sweatshirt worn by the man she saw at the crime scene and officers' failure
to find a brown or similar sweatshirt on the defendant or at his apartment
reduces the probability to 78.5 percent, almost certainly raising a

reasonable doubt. 14 5
Despite the availability of analyses such as these, it remains the
practice today, following California's oft-cited decision in People v.
Collins, to forbid judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to help jurors
aggregate the quantified weight of individual matches and non-matches
between crime-scene evidence and the defendant, as an aid in solving the
whodunit. 14 6 This is so even if jurors (1) are only invited and not required
to use Bayesian analysis and are instructed in its use via explanations
proven to enable lay persons to use the theorem reliably;147 (2) are allowed
to estimate the prior-odds and the likelihood ratio's numerator and
denominator themselves in the usual way jurors assess evidence; (3) are
aided in making estimates by the introduction of population frequencies
(e.g., of left-handedness and cigarette smoking) from reliable time- and
place-specific censuses of human features and elective behavior (e.g.,
wearing brown sweatshirts at a particular time and place) that ubiquitous
security cameras and consumer information services now make possible; 148
145. Id. at 590-95.
146. See id. at 597-600, 670-73 (discussing People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968)).
147. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(describing massive amounts of data collected on individuals' whereabouts by "automatic toll collection
systems" and "wireless carriers [that] track and record the location of users" of wireless devices); id. at
957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing cellular and Internet service providers' and online retailers'
collection of consumers' phone numbers, email addresses, and book, grocery, and medication choices);
Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 620-22 (discussing breadth and acuity of information captured by
security cameras); Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
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and (4) can plug their estimates into a tool similar to a mortgage calculator
that performs the Bayesian arithmetic for them.149
Curiously, the "'gold standard' of identity evidence"-DNA-is a
product of this same sort of aggregative analysis.'so DNA is not a "genetic
fingerprint" unique to a single human being. Rather, it is a collection of
genetic traits, each present in hundreds of millions or even billions of
individuals, that are powerful evidence only when the aggregate probability
that, say, nine or thirteen such traits would occur in a single, randomly
selected individual is calculated.'"' Fingerprints are not best understood as
a unique trait either.' 5 2 They are a mass of unremarkable lines, swirls, and
intersections at measurable distances from each other that, again, are
powerful evidence only when the probability of all of them occurring
together is considered.153 Indeed, as the verbatim recording of confessions
becomes the norm, even this most classic form of "direct" evidence will
best be understood not as a unique marker of the culprit but as
circumstantial evidence whose value depends on the power of the matches
and non-matches between actions and conditions described in the
confession and those known to have characterized the crime but not been
communicated to the confessing suspect by police.15 4
True, with DNA (but not fingerprints or confessions), there is a finite
number of discrete features to consider, with frequencies that we now know
are nearly independent of each other. 55 But it has taken twenty-five years
of intensive trial and error and adversarial scrubbing to get technicians to
use precise enough methods to identify the discrete features accurately and
to confirm their independence.' 5 6 Because the latter uncertainty persisted
for so long, statisticians developed ameliorative procedures for estimating
(discussing the wide
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
variety of information available to and used by companies to determine and influence consumer buying
habits); Sengupta, supra note 75 (discussing police use of drones and of tools that automatically analyze
surveillance camera videos and comb through "data bases, from license-plate readers to sensors that can
pick up heightened radiation levels to arrest records," which can "find a car associated with a possible
lawbreaker and analyze where that car has been seen over the last several weeks").
149. See Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 676-78 (describing commercially available Bayesian
calculators).
150. Id.at 601.
Id. at 605-06.
151.
152. Id. at 641-42.
153. Id. at 601, 641-42.
154. Id. at 603-04.
155. DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 40-52, 124-26 (2010).
156. See Liebman et al., supranote 129, at 612-17 (describing the improvements that have taken
place over the last twenty years in data-mining, statistical analysis, and laboratory practices with regard
to DNA evidence).
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probabilities to neutralize the effect of any interdependence that might have
been present, which now can be used in aggregating the probabilities of
features that certainly are interdependent.157 Nor did the courts wait to use
DNA to make consequential decisions until all uncertainties were
conclusively removed, including some that persist today.158 The history of
DNA thus suggests that a good way to reach the gold standard is to
acknowledge the value of aggregating the weight of multiple matches and
non-matches and to use adversarial procedures to discipline the process. 159
Doing so could improve current-often quite risky-practice not only as to
confessions and fingerprints,' 60 but also as to large swaths of other
evidence, such as a description of the culprit as a 5'8" white woman in her
twenties and a red skirt, and evidence that the defendant had the same traits
when seen nearby at the time.
By ignoring the aggregate effect of matches and non-matches, courts
surrender potentially powerful evidence not only of a particular defendant's
guilt or innocence but also of the comparative effectiveness of police and
prosecutors.' 6 ' Imagine two identity cases in which five identical bits of
matching evidence link the suspect to the crime scene. Imagine, as well,
that police find five identical markers at both scenes that do not match the
suspect, and an additional ten non-matching items at the second, but not the
first, of the two scenes. Bayesian analysis can show that the suspect in the
latter, five-of-twenty-matching-markers case is more probably innocent
than the suspect in the five-of-ten-matching-markers case. Of course, few
individual cases are likely to be this comparable, but the run of cases that
different police departments and detectives face are likely to be
comparable, so that a department or detective that makes arrests in cases
with substantially higher proportions of non-matches on average than other
agencies or officers is probably generating more faulty arrests and
157. Id at 617.
158. Id. at 609 n.134 (discussing Virginia's 1994 execution of Timothy Spencer based largely on a
DNA match made when the procedure was in its infancy and subject to multiple uncertainties and
noting uncertainties that remain today). See also, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 134 (describing apparent
DNA misidentification due to contamination of evidence); Osagie K. Obasogie, High-Tech, High-Risk
Forensics, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/opinion/high-tech-highrisk-forensics.html? (discussing continuing problems with DNA, including contamination and a
relatively high probability of misidentification from "cold hit" comparisons of crime-scene DNA to
profiles collected in DNA databanks).
159. Liebman et al., supranote 129, at 617.
160. See, e.g., id. at 601-04 (describing the aggregative analysis responsible for the power of
DNA evidence and explaining how the application of similar "disciplined measures to expose the
aggregate power of matches and non-matches" could be used to increase the accuracy of confession and
eyewitness testimony evidence).
161. Id at 687.
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convictions.
Police departments and detectives, however, rarely calculate the
number of markers associated with crimes that could potentially match a
suspect to the crime or, as good practice requires, lay down crime scene
grids and videotape the contents of each small cell. 162 Nor do they use
interview checklists to mine witnesses for all categories of identifying
information they might have.1 63 Even markers that police reports and
photos capture are rarely counted, and non-matching traits are rarely treated
as Brady material and turned over to the defense so that it can count the
matches and non-matches.1 64 The courts are partly to blame for these gaps
because they routinely bar efforts to quantify the effect of matches or nonmatches in court. 165 Nor are courts likely to admit information about police
agencies' or detectives' comparative match and non-match rates to help
jurors assess an investigation's credibility or the reasonableness of doubts it
leaves.' 66 Courts thus forgo powerful incentives for police to document all
trace evidence and consider the aggregate weight of the matches and nonmatches in each case and the pattern of matches and non-matches in all
cases.167
D. (DE)VALUED LEARNING FROM CAREFULLY OBSERVED COLLECTIVE
EXPERIENCE

Three curiosities cannot capture the dispositions of all criminal courts,
but they suggest a disturbing resistance to using the rigorous examination
of well-documented collective experience to reveal the truth and expose
error. This resistance extends to the full range of techniques used
effectively in other domains: basing decisions on how the system operates
in all cases, not just the one at hand; aggregating instances; identifying
patterns; and comparing results at each site to prior results there and
contemporaneous results at other sites.1 68 In all three examples, moreover,
courts resist learning from experience despite their own or the public's
recognition of the value of quantifying and comparing past experience to
162. Id. at 623, 681.
163. Id. at 681.
164. Id. at 661, 663-64.
165. Id. at 671-72.
166. See id. at 667-70 (describing the practical and legal obstacles to finding and admitting
evidence suggesting the guilt of third parties who were previously under investigation in connection
with the crime at issue).
167. Police have been at the forefront of using Big Data in developing crime-fighting techniques
not routinely regulated by courts. See supra notes 75, 148 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 62-76 and infra notes 174-75.
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improve the system. Drawing on some fitful innovations by the Supreme
Court itself, the next part proposes several strategies criminal courts could
adopt to harness the corrective power of rigorously observed collective
experience.
V. STRATEGIES FOR CAREFULLY ANALYZING COLLECTIVE
EXPERIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. LEARNING FROM PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR

The simplest strategy for using collective experience to discipline
criminal justice is to attend to patterns of behavior of which the action at
issue in the case is an example. The indifference shown by the Supreme
Court to racial death-sentencing patterns in Georgia and varying
interpretations of a facially overbroad capital aggravating factor in Idahol 69
and by criminal courts generally to patterns of error in capital cases and to
counts of matches and non-matches in identity cases are not a given. 170 in
Furman and several contemporaneous cases, the Court used patterns of
behavior across entire fields of action to inform itself about how
individuals and institutions tend to behave, why they do so, and even what
the law-in-action is as revealed by patterns of official behavior.' 7 ' These
precedents reveal that courts can easily gather evidence of their own
collective experience and that of repeat players in their courtrooms, create
incentives for administrators and researchers to generate still more
information,1 72 and rely on the revealed patterns of behavior to guide
169. See supranotes 102-110 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 111-167 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-37 (1978) (invalidating criminal juries with
fewer than six members based on studies indicating that juries with fewer than twelve members tend to
deliberate less effectively and accurately than twelve-person juries); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
496-98 (1977) (shifting burden to state to disprove that jury-selection procedures are discriminatory
once defendant establishes a substantial pattern of underrepresentation of Hispanics on a jurisdiction's
juries); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977) (ruling that
discriminatory motivation may be inferred in part from patterns of behavior or departures from normal
substantive or procedural practices that tend to disadvantage members of racial or ethnic minorities);
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (holding that a finding of
intentional school segregation within a "meaningful portion" of a school district creates a rebuttable
presumption that patterns of segregation elsewhere are also intentional); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (prohibiting employment practices unrelated to job performance that have a
disproportionate negative effect over time on minorities); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18
(1968) (deferring judgment on whether juries made up entirely of individuals without conscientious
scruples against the death penalty are more prone to convict pending further study of patterns of
decisions by death-qualified and non-death-qualified juries); supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text
(discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
172. See, e.g., Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232-37 (discussed supra note 171); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
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decisions or at least trigger further analysis.17 3
B. PUBLISHING DATA ABOUT CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS
Publicizing information about error rates, near-misses, and costs, then
comparing results across courts, agencies, subdivisions, and individuals,
can incentivize and empower actors to shrink the number of potentially
embarrassing outcomes and increase efficiency. 174 Some commentators
have recently proposed this strategy to deter excessive, coercive,
retaliatory, or racially selective Terry stops, arrests, interrogations, charges,
and plea bargains.175 Criminal courts could adapt this strategy to their
needs by receiving evidence on the numbers and rates of matches and nonmatches between suspects and crime-scene clues, eyewitness descriptions,
and details of confessions and by calculating rates of judicial, lawenforcement, and defense error exposed on appellate review. 176 Data on the
relevant outcomes typically are available in the judicial system's own
records.1 77 Data on potentially causal factors can be generated by asking
police, prosecutors, and defense counsel to key-in biographical,
demographic, situational, and procedural information about defendants,
victims, offenses, investigations, and procedures as they make stops or
517-18 (discussed supra note 171).
173. See supra notes 91-94, 171 (describing decisions relying on statistics and behavioral
patterns).

174. See, e.g., REES, supra note 64, at 91-120 (discussing a debate over whether nuclear power
plant rates of errors and near-misses developed through industry self-regulation should be disclosed to
the public or only to the leadership of the regulated companies; concluding that the industry's decision
to adopt the latter course contributed to industry-wide improvements); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Information-ForcingRegulation and Environmental Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN
THE EU AND THE US 293, 301-05 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2007) (explaining how the
penalty default created by the all-or-nothing nature of the Endangered Species Act creates incentives for
developers and environmentalists to cooperate and share information with each other to develop Habitat
Conservation Plans that, when approved by the Department of the Interior, replace the act's
enforcement scheme); Erlend Nier & Ursel Baumann, Market Discipline,Disclosureand Moral Hazard
in Banking, 15 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 332 (2006); Sabel, Fung & Karkkainen, supranote 66, at 11618, 121-23 (discussing the ameliorative effect of public disclosure of the amount of emissions of toxic
chemicals under the federal Toxics Release Inventory and the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction
Act).
175. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 11, at 120, 212, 301 (proposing public disclosure to deter
coercive and abusive interrogation, charging, and plea bargaining practices); Garrett, supra note 82, at
107-47 (proposing ways to use data on the number and outcomes of police stops under different
circumstances as a tool for limiting abuses and maximizing law-enforcement effect); Johnson, supra
note 68, at 407-16 (discussing congressional statute requiring juvenile justice authorities to record
racial patterns of arrest and disposition and develop plans for addressing disparities).
176. Liebman et al., supranote 129, at 685-87.
177. Gelman et al., supranote 111, at 211, 214, 216-17, 235.
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arrests, charge suspects, or enter appearances for defendants.17 8
C. USING DATA TO REVEAL THE DEMOCRATIC GOING RATE ON
DIFFICULT INTERPRETIVE QUESTIONS

This and the next section discuss decisionmaking innovations by the
Supreme Court itself that illustrate the ability of criminal courts to use data
not only to reveal the effectiveness of their own actions and solutions but
also to trigger innovations that broaden the solution set. The data-andinnovation-forcing mechanism in each case is a "penalty default"-a threat
by the Court to mandate a single inflexible solution to the problem at hand
unless the regulated entities craft their own locally tailored solution and
measure its effectiveness.1 79
A regulatory difficulty criminal courts often face is deciphering the
meaning of constraints the Bill of Rights places on the administration of
criminal justice. Deciding whether the manner in which a state imposes or
executes capital sentences is "cruel and unusual" is a good example. 8 0
Furman and later decisions developed a partially aggregative solution to
this problem. In Furman, the Court overturned every capital-sentencing
statute in the nation by reading the Eighth Amendment to forbid wholly
discretionary procedures, but it was initially unable to discern the
procedures that provision allows. The Court addressed this problem by
adopting the penalty default of abolition and challenging States that wanted
the death penalty to formulate their own procedures that (1) were consistent
with the "evolving standards of decency" on which the Court had
previously relied in "cruel and unusual" punishment cases and
(2) generated sentences proportional to the killings for which they were
imposed. 181
178. See, e.g., supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (describing the statutorily mandated
collection of information on the offenders, victims, and crimes involved in death penalty cases to
facilitate judicial review of the comparative proportionality of death verdicts imposed).
179. For discussions of penalty defaults, see, for example, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1989)
(describing how contract law uses onerous requirements to encourage contracting parties to "contract
around" the rule, creating incentives to redress information asymmetries and develop tailored
solutions); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 452-64 (1998); Karkkainen, supra note 174, at 297-304; Liebman et al., supra
note 129, at 680; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
LitigationSucceeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015, 1067 (2004).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also Liebman, supra note 85, at 113-14 (describing the
difficulty of interpreting the Eighth Amendment).
181. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(premising cruel and unusual punishment decision in part on whether the practice in question was
consistent with the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society").
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Having thus prompted states to expand the potential solution set, the
Court applied the "evolving standards" test to each option by counting the
number of states endorsing each one and in some cases counting the
number of death sentences juries imposed under particular conditions. In
essence, the Court used the preponderance of legislative and jury choices to
reveal the nation's current moral coordinates with respect to each option.
Over a quarter century, the Court ruled the death penalty potentially
constitutional for deliberate homicide, but unconstitutional for the
following: if it was mandated for all individuals who committed a broadly
or narrowly defined murder; imposed for rape of an adult or child; imposed
for being an accessory to murder absent major participation in an
accompanying felony or an aggravated mental state as to the killing; or
carried out against someone who was "mentally retarded" at the time of the
killing, a juvenile at the time of the killing, or insane at the time of the
execution.' 82 By forcing states wishing to avoid abolition to generate new
information about death-sentencing options and the degree of democratic
consensus supporting each, the Court increased both the predictability and
democratic legitimacy of its judgments.' 83
182. Head-counting decisions include Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008) (holding
that state may not punish aggravated rape of a child with death: "it is of significance that, in 45 [state]
jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind"); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 564 (2005) ("The evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for
juveniles .... [includes that] 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have
rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial
interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002)
("[T]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons . .. provides
powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal."); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408, 410 (1986) ("[N]o State
in the Union permits the execution of the insane."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-96 (1982)
("weigh[ing] on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue" in the case that (1) "only
a small minority of jurisdictions-eight-allow the death penalty to be imposed solely because the
defendant somehow participated in the robbery in the course of which a murder was committed," and
(2) the eight states that theoretically allow the death penalty under these circumstances rarely impose it
in such cases); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) ("The current judgment with respect to the
death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.");
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 179-82, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting, in the process of
holding that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, that most state legislatures chose to
reinstate capital punishment after the Court overturned preexisting capital statutes several years earlier).
More recently, the Court has used the preponderance of state practices to regulate the punishment of life
without parole for juveniles. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470-74 (2012); Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023-26 (2010).
183. See Liebman, supra note 85, at 111-13 (concluding that the Court's early decisions on
comparative proportionality review in effect created a system in which the Court shared constitutional
responsibility with state courts and legislatures for determining whether particular categories of uses of
the death penalty constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
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By encouraging states to adopt "comparative proportionality review,"
Gregg v. Georgia initiated a similar innovation for answering the second
constitutional question: whether sentences generated by a state's capital
statute were proportional to the severity of the particular killing.' 84 The
difficulty here is to reconcile the twin aims of the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence and of centuries of criminal law: clear standards that generate
consistent outcomes and the flexibility to dispense mercy based on the
"diverse frailties of humankind."18 5 By requiring state high courts to
compare all sentences meted out in potential capital murder cases and to
invalidate outlier death sentences imposed for insufficiently aggravated
murders, the Court used state judges' extraction of the aggregate moral
judgment embedded in the run of hundreds of prosecutors' charging and
jurors' sentencing decisions to expose each state's capital "going rate."186
The responsibility then assumedly would fall to the U.S. Supreme Court to
use the going rates of all states to extract a national going rate and overturn
outlier-thus cruel and unusual-death sentences for particular crimes (as
it occasionally did in the 1980s and 1990s),187 for entire categories of
murder (as it also did),188 or for state capital-punishment schemes that
generated patterns of outcomes outside the national mainstream.189
As we note above, however, starting in 1984, the Court disavowed any
requirement that state courts engage in comparative analysis of deathsentencing patterns in search of moral "going rates" and outliers and then
refused to conduct such analysis itself.' 90 Still, the head-counting the Court
continues to do and the comparative proportionality structures it
184. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
185. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) ("[T]he law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment
[is] at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the
individual.").
186. See Liebman, supra note 85, at 113-18 (arguing that "[t]he Court's ingenious set of postFurman proposals for sharing constitutional decisionmaking with local institutions was a striking
example of' the use of aggregative and comparative analysis to improve judicial interpretation of the
Constitution and achieve greater consistency in the application ofthe death penalty).
187. See, e.g., id. at 41-50 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court appears to have
conducted its own substantive review of capital outcomes).
188. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding the death penalty
categorically disproportionate when imposed for the crime of being an accessory to a robbery in the
course of which someone else killed the victim and absent proof that the accessory intended or
attempted to kill the victim).
189. See Liebman, supra note 85, at 59-62, 73, 85, 113-18 ("[I]n cases close to the line,
especially where the legislative category, sentencing pattern, or case outcome was different from those
generated by most other local actors, the Court's scheme contemplated that it would review the matter
for itself.").
190. See supratext accompanying notes 102-10.
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temporarily envisioned reveal how the aggregate decisions of juries,
prosecutors, courts, and legislators can guide and confer democratic
legitimacy on the courts' search for legal meaning.
D. BENCHMARKING PROMISING PRACTICES
The Court also has recognized that systematically comparing the
results of local experimentation in the shadow of penalty defaults can
improve criminal justice. This approach works best when the difficulty is
not defining legal standards but deciding how best to satisfy them, and
when evaluation of local innovations is not by head-counting but by
comparing how each performs. "Plan-" or "management-based" strategies
of this sort are used in many domains to induce regulated entities to
determine how the relevant problem manifests at each of their sites and to
develop a site-specific plan for solving it.191 All plans then are evaluated
centrally, including by benchmarking the quantitatively and qualitatively
assessed results of each plan against those at similar sites and approving the
better performers while disapproving the laggards. 192 This technique allows
more local flexibility than the bureaucratic specification of steps that every
regulated entity must take or the performance-based specification of
minimum or maximum outcomes that all regulated entities must or may
reach.' 93
Furman's invalidation of discretionary death-sentencing and invitation
to States to avoid the penalty default of abolition by developing their own
alternatives again provides a crude example.' 94 States responded by
adopting various versions of two approaches-mandatory death sentences
for more or less narrowly defined categories of murder, and "guided
discretion" mechanisms that use statutorily enumerated aggravating
circumstances to narrow death-eligibility, then net out the aggravating and
mitigating effect of available sentencing information. After comparing
dozens of iterations of the two approaches, the Court eventually rejected
the former approach in all its forms and insisted that states adopt a version
of the latter approach that permits defendants to rely on any mitigating
factor that at least one juror might accept as a basis for a sentence less than
See supranotes 64-76 and accompanying text.
191.
192. For discussions of how various management-based strategies are implemented, see, for
example, Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 47, at 717-18; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 179, at 433-34;
Johnson, supra note 68, at 407-16; Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General:
Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1339, 1362-70, 1393-99 (2012); Liebman et
al., supra note 129, at 679-81.
193. See supranotes 53-62 and accompanying text.
194. See supratext accompanying notes 95-101, 181-83.
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death.'95 The Court's plan-based strategy remained crude, however,
because beyond head-counting, it reached conclusions by speculating about
the patterns of death sentences each option might generate, while
eschewing data about how well each actually performed.19 6
The Court's mid-1960s decisions in Miranda v. Arizona'97 and United

States v. Wade 98 provide additional examples, though, again, neither
realized its potential. Both decisions reflect a conclusion that the Court's
prior strategy of case-by-case evaluation of, respectively, confessions and
eyewitness identifications under broad "involuntariness" and "reliability"
standards was ineffective, along with a concern that any single procedure
for obtaining confessions and identifications that the Court required would
be unsuited to many situations. So, instead, the Court imposed default
procedures-Miranda warnings and rules for conducting lineups, each
enforced by exclusionary rules-and invited localities to avoid the default
by adopting locally tailored alternatives that were "at least as effective."' 99
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 43-48 (2004) (per curiam) (forbidding states to limit
mitigating factors jurors may rely upon in choosing a sentence less than death by defining such factors
to encompass only some of their mitigating potential); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988)
(requiring states to let individual jurors rely on mitigating factors that the full jury does not
unanimously agree are present); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (forbidding states
to bar the sentencer from considering the defendant's difficult childhood as a mitigating factor); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (forbidding states to limit mitigating circumstances to a short
list); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (generally approving Texas's guided
discretion death-sentencing procedures); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S., 242, 253 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (generally approving Florida's guided discretion procedures); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (generally approving Georgia's guided discretion procedures). For
decisions rejecting broad and narrow forms of mandatory death-sentencing, see, for example, Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1987) (forbidding state to mandate death for all murders committed by
prisoners serving life sentences for murder); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 634, 637 (1977) (per
curiam) (state may not mandate death for all murders of police officers); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 289-93, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion) (forbidding states to mandate death for all firstdegree murders).
196. See, e.g., supranotes 182-83 and accompanying text.
197. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
198. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
199. Id. at 239 (inviting jurisdictions to forgo Court-imposed procedures if they adopted
"[1]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks
of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings"); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 490
(encouraging law enforcement agencies "to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective
ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of criminal laws"
by allowing them to adopt substitutes for the Court's postarrest warnings and exclusionary-rule that
"are fully as effective"). See also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 179, at 452-54 (discussing the Court's
prophylactic holding in Miranda); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword:
ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 20-26 (1975) (arguing that prophylactic rules of
the sort the Court created in Miranda to shore up Fifth Amendment protections can be justified as a
form of constitutional common law that fosters beneficial self-regulation by law enforcement).
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In deciding whether alternatives to Miranda were "as effective," for
example, the Court assumedly planned to consider information about the
numbers and proportion of arrests resulting in interrogations, interrogations
leading to confessions, confessions leading to convictions, convictions
challenged and reversed on appeal, and whether interrogations were
recorded and demonstrated the voluntariness of statements made. We will
never know, however, because the Court's default rules were so
undemanding that police and prosecutors never developed alternatives. 200
Wisconsin's recent treatment of eyewitness identifications
demonstrates what an effective penalty default rule and benchmarking
strategy might look like. 20 1 In State v. Dubose, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court interpreted the state constitution to exclude eyewitness
identifications produced by "unnecessarily suggestive" procedures, 202 a
standard more likely to protect innocent defendants than the federal rule.203
The Wisconsin Legislature effectively turned Dubose into a penalty default
by allowing local law enforcement agencies to avoid its effect by
developing their own plans for "reduc[ing] the potential for erroneous
identifications." 204 It instructed localities to adopt procedures shown by
research to improve "objectivity and reliability," to file their new policies
with the Wisconsin Department of Justice, and to revise them every two
years based on statewide experience. 205 As an aid, the state Justice
Department issues and periodically revises model procedures.206 Texas has
adopted a similar regime. 207
By comparatively benchmarking the plans against each other based on
factors such as how often each results in positive identifications, how often
identifications are validated by conviction, and how often challenged
convictions are upheld on appeal, the Justice Department can now help the
200. Liebman et al., supranote 129, at 682.
201. For fuller discussions, see Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's
New Governance Experiment, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 645, 685-95; Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 68384.
202. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 592 (Wis. 2005).
203. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 114 (1977) (permitting the introduction of an
eyewitness identification made as a result of suggestive procedures as long as the trial court determines
that the identification is likely to be "reliable" as indicated by a set of forgiving criteria).
204. WIS. STAT. § 175.50(2) (2006).
205. Id. § 175.50(5).
206. Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 683.
207. H.B. 215, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (requiring law enforcement agencies either to
adopt a strong set of default standards and procedures for live and photographic lineups or implement
equally or more protective policies). For one version of the default standards and procedures, see BLL
BLACKWOOD LAW ENFORCEMENT MGMT. INST. TEX., EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION MODEL POLICY,

availableat http://www.lemitonline.org/publicationsdocuments/ewid-final.pdf.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court apply Dubose with the aid of comparative data
identifying outlier counties and procedures. To increase the effectiveness of
the system even further, Wisconsin might empower jurors, when evaluating
the weight of identifications, to compare the procedures used in the county
at hand to those used in other counties, along with the procedures' error
rates. Doing so would incentivize police to adopt procedures they are
comfortable defending to well-informed jurors. 208
Generalizing this approach, courts could encourage law enforcement
to conduct more reliable investigations without imposing inflexible rules by
allowing defense counsel to present evidence of investigative procedures
used elsewhere in the state and the procedures' comparative results. 209 For
example, Massachusetts allows trial judges to instruct jurors to consider
whether shortcomings in the state's investigation affected the "quality,
reliability or credibility of the [state's] evidence."2 10 Allowing defense
counsel to compare a locality's practices to those used elsewhere would
encourage localities to adopt the superior practice of other jurisdictions.
E. REGULATING MORE BY MANDATING LESS
By attaching consequences to comparative patterns of results, the
strategies discussed here would supplant bureaucratic enforcement of
inflexible rules via nuclear remedies with more effective, site-specific
regulation driven by democratic and adversarial innovation. Courts could
accomplish more while mandating less by (1) impelling judges and other
criminal justice actors to measure their own results and error rates,
(2) setting penalty defaults that apply only when jurisdictions fail to tackle
the problems the data reveal, and (3) overturning outliers based on
deviations from standards established by the collective behavior of
democratic institutions, not by off-the-cuff judgments of unelected judges.
208. Cf James M. Lampinen et al., The Reactions of Mock Jurors to the Department of Justice
Guidelinesfor the Collection and Preservation of Eyewitness Evidence, 27(2) BASIC & APP. SOC.
PSYCH. 155, 155-62 (2005) (finding that mock jurors evaluating eyewitness identifications after being
informed of U.S. Justice Department guidelines for conducting identifications rated questionable
eyewitness-identification procedures and testimony less credible than did the study subjects who were
not informed about the guidelines).
209. Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 685-87.
210.

MASS.

CRIMINAL

MODEL

JURY

INSTRUCTIONS

No.

3.740

(2009),

http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts-and-judges/courts/district-court/jury-instructionscriminal/3740-evidence-omissions-in-police-investigations.pdf

available at
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VI. (UNPERSUASIVE) REASONS FOR COURTS' INDIFFERENCE
TO COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE
This part assesses three reasons why criminal courts may resist the
corrective use of collective experience, despite those courts' and other
domains' recognition of its value. We conclude that the first two reasons
are outdated, and the third-an ideological preference-explains but does
not justify the courts' negative disposition toward collective experience.
A. TECHNICAL INCOMPETENCE
The Supreme Court sometimes dismisses the evaluation of aggregate
criminal justice experience as "not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake." 2 1 1 This section discusses
the courts' competence to collect and analyze data. The next section
discusses their competence to draw inferences from the results of such
analyses about matters of policy that arguably are the domain of the
political branches.
For reasons already mentioned, the difficulty of obtaining and
analyzing data no longer justifies incompetence concerns. Nearly all the
required data already exist, often in the records of criminal courts and
criminal justice agencies themselves, or can easily be willed into existence
through the penalty default and other "plan-based" regulatory mechanisms
discussed above. 2 12 Tools for analyzing the data also are available. 213 And
compared to other uses of data, the ones proposed here raise less serious
privacy concerns, because they mainly rely on material already in public
records and are entirely summative, not person-specific, which is consistent
with uses permitted by the strictest forms of legislation protecting
vulnerable populations from disclosure of government data. 214
211.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 470 (1996) (citing Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1983)) (making case-specific proof of discrimination a prerequisite to discovery of
data on prosecutorial charging decisions in support of a claim of selective prosecution of blacks in crack
cocaine cases).
212. See supranotes 77-79, 111-18, 176-77, 191-209 and accompanying text.
213.
Compare, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1335-37, 1360-63 (1971) (doubting that jurors could competently
use Bayesian analysis to aggregate the probabilities of matches between the defendant and crime-scene
markers and arguing that the effort was futile in any event given a lack of frequency data on relevant
traits such as how many men in a particular neighborhood have long hair or wear a particular type of
shoe), with Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 674-79 (describing recent studies establishing the
accessibility of Bayesian analysis to lay decisionmakers when it is properly explained to them, and the
broad availability today of frequency information from ubiquitous security cameras and the like).
214. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(b)(1)(F),
1232g(b)(1)(K) (2012) (permitting research uses of sensitive data on school children that report results
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Nor should courts and lawyers continue to be excused-or amusedby the old saw, "if I were good at numbers, I would not have gone to law
school." If a corporate or white-collar-criminal lawyer demurred on this
basis when asked to analyze the financials or market analyses in a case, she
would lose her job. It is time for judges and lawyers in blue-collar criminal
cases to catch up to this reality. Even concerns about how jurors handle
aggregative analysis are overblown. Although jurors do not understand
Bayesian equations very well, recent studies show that they reach
appropriate Bayesian judgments when instructed using demonstrative
diagrams instead of equations. Once jurors get the basic concept,
analogously to their understanding of long division, it is appropriate for
them to use Bayesian calculators to process their analyses after using the
usual inductive reasoning to fill in the variables. 2 15

B. HUMILrY
Neither is humility a good reason for criminal courts to resist
aggregation and comparison. True, worries about doing things others do
better and about doing too much are peculiarly judicial concerns warranted
by the separation of powers between courts and the political branches. As
we already have noted, however, criminal courts' core function includes
the daily administration of criminal justice in close coordination with
police officials, forensic scientists, prosecutors, and public defenders. 2 16
For courts to disclaim the responsibilities of administrators, therefore, is to
place the system's accuracy, as well as its legality, at risk.
Still, systemic analysis may pose particular threats to the courts'
legitimacy if it triggers expansive remedies that are especially the province
of democratically disciplined officials. After attempting large scale social
engineering through its criminal justice rulings of the 1960s and 1970s, the
Supreme Court has little stomach left for broad procedural edicts. 2 17
Recently, for example, it refused to give prisoners a right to postconviction
testing of DNA evidence possessed by the state in order to avoid "tak[ing]
the development of rules and procedures in this area out of the hands of
legislatures and state courts shaping policy in a focused manner and
turn[ing] it over to federal courts applying the broad parameters of the Due
Process Clause." 218
"in an aggregate form that does not identify any individual").
215. Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 676-79.
216. See supra notes 13-38, 82-90 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
218. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 56 (2009).
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Again, however, our earlier discussion explains why humility is a bad
reason to forbear aggregative analysis, given the courts' responsibility to
regulate their own procedures, 21 9 the ill effects of judicial inaction on
legislative and administrative innovation, 220 and the ability of courts-in
lieu of policy-monopolizing undemocratic mandates-to use penalty
defaults, comparative benchmarking, adversarial testing, and other
mechanisms to base decisions on the innovations and moral judgments of
democratically constrained officials and juries. 221
Indeed, by allowing sophisticated comparison, gradation, and
exposure of outliers, aggregative analysis allows courts to employ even
humbler remedies than were previously available. Statistical aggregation
and comparison have many of the advantages-and their greater precision
avoids many of the disadvantages-of the most modest forms of judicial
decisionmaking, such as case-level balancing and totality-of-circumstances
analysis. An example is provided by the Court's dubious McCleskey
decision.2 22 Faced with evidence that Georgia death-sentencing patterns
were explainable on no basis other than race, Justice Powell's majority
opinion apocalyptically predicted that granting relief would effectively bar
jurisdictions from using not only the death penalty but also all forms of
contextualizing and humanizing discretion in resolving criminal cases. 223
As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, however, the data themselves pointed
the way to far more modest relief, given that racial disparities did not
appear in highly mitigated and highly aggravated cases. 224 Relief thus
could be limited to a targeted subset of midrange cases. 225 Or, the Court
could require Georgia to choose among procedures that other states use to
limit death sentences to superaggravated cases, 226 to use comparative
proportionality review to screen-out low-aggravation outliers, 227 or to
219. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n. 11(1959) (noting federal courts'
power to regulate procedure in criminal cases absent contrary congressional mandates); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1943) (invoking appellate courts' "supervisory authority over the
administration of criminal justice"); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases: Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of the FederalCourts, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1433, 1435-64 (1984) (cataloguing federal courts' invocation of the inherent power to regulate criminal
procedures).
220. See, e.g., supratext accompanying notes 162-67.
221. See supra Part V.
222. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
223. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-18.
224. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. See Liebman & Marshall, supra note 93, at 1665 (cataloguing steps jurisdictions can take to
narrow the death penalty).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101, 184-89.
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overturn low-aggravation cases on a totality-of-the-circumstances basis.228
As these examples indicate, resort to deductive data analysis will not
absolve courts of inductive judgment and line-drawing. But induction
disciplined by data and structured analysis allows an intermediate kind of
judgment that the Pragmatists call "abduction." As they have shown, such
analysis is far closer to the gold standard of deductive reasoning than is
unstructured intuition. 229
C. PROTECTION OF LIBERTY
There is a more visceral explanation for the courts' resistance to
rigorous evidence of collective experience: the libertarian concern that
aggregative analysis is a form of inquisitorial decisionmaking that
jeopardizes sacred freedoms. Most at risk, it is said, are adversarial
protections and the assurance of individualized decisionmaking that
animates the ban on character evidence, preferences for "direct" over
"circumstantial" evidence and for individualized over statistical proof of
discrimination, and restrictions on defensive evidence implicating thirdparty suspects. A classic of this genre is Laurence Tribe's 1971 article Trial
by Mathematics, which contends that efforts to quantify the probability that
a defendant is guilty by aggregating probabilities associated with individual
matches between crime-scene evidence and the defendant would violate
our commitments to the presumption of innocence, trial by jury, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and punishing people for their actions and not
for being members of a certain class. 230
Tribe's concerns notwithstanding, there is every reason to believe that
banning aggregative analysis is more harmful than helpful to the rights of
criminal defendants who are innocent or undeserving of particular
penalties. This was true of Carlos DeLuna, who could not use Bayesian
analysis to show that, collectively, the many individually trivial nonmatches between himself and the crime scene created more than a
reasonable doubt about his guilt. 23 1 It was also true of many dozens of
228.
229.

See supranote 187 and accompanying text.
See ANSELL, supra note 47, at 202-03 n.12 (explaining that "abduction is more deliberate

than intuition"); CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM AS A PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF RIGHT

THINKING: THE 1903 HARVARD LECTURES ON PRAGMATISM 217-18 (Patricia Ann Turrisi ed., 1997)
(defining abduction as modes of reasoning that study facts, devise a hypothesis to explain them, and test
the hypothesis based on the observation of common experience).
230. Tribe, supra note 213, at 1355-78. See also Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 600
(discussing Tribe's critique of aggregative evidence).
231. See Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 585, 653-54 (listing non-matches that could have been
aggregated to show that DeLuna was innocent or at least that there was a reasonable doubt as to his
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innocent prisoners whose exonerations reveal that they were harmed by our
system's overweighting of confessions, eyewitness identifications,
fingerprints, and other seemingly "individualizing" proof, in lieu of
rigorous efforts to aggregate the effect of all kinds of match and non-match
evidence. 232 And it was true of Warren McCleskey, who could not rely on
systemic analysis to show the influence of race on his death sentence.2 33
The crucial role of the adversarial system in domesticating DNA
analysis and current efforts to enhance the adversarial testing of confession,
eyewitness, and fingerprint evidence similarly reveal that aggregative
analysis and adversarial process are not at odds.234 Likewise, Bayesian
analysis can be shown to justify both the common-law character rule,
which deters heuristic departures from statistical truths that result from
inattention to base rates, and also that rule's "modus operandi," "common
scheme," "habit," and "business routine" exceptions, all of which use a
form of aggregative analysis to aid the search for truth.235 Again, there is
no inherent conflict between aggregative analysis and liberty-protecting
procedures.
Sometimes, however, the criminal law's individualizing and antiaggregative dispositions are justifiable only as a libertarian, antigovernment
prejudice and not because they protect the liberty of innocent, overcharged,
or overpunished defendants. This is true, for example, of (1) the preference
for direct over circumstantial evidence, which thankfully the courts are
gradually abandoning; 236 (2) the still-strong disposition of lawenforcement, jurors, and judges to overvalue evidence they falsely consider
to be "unique" and "individual" such as eyewitness, confession, and
fingerprint evidence; 23 7 (3) the failure to adopt Bayesian analysis of match
guilt); supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
232. See Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 584-87, 625-28 (demonstrating the use of Bayesian
analysis to show that multiple individually inconsequential non-matches can aggregate to a reasonable
doubt of guilt).
233. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
234. Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 610-18. See also supra notes 155-60 and accompanying
text.
235.
See, e.g., RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 336-40, 351-54, 364-72 (4th ed. 2011) (using Bayesian analysis
to highlight the inaccuracies that can result from juror misuse of character evidence and to justify the
propensity rule and its exceptions).
236. See Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 657-58 (discussing modem trend toward weighing
direct and circumstantial evidence equally).
237. See id. at 627-28 (discussing social psychological evidence that humans instinctively rely
more heavily on individualized evidence and give less weight to circumstantial evidence than both
types of evidence deserve).
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and non-match evidence;2 38 (4) the courts' stubborn resistance to evidence
of a "third-party's" guilt and demand that criminal trials be an
individualized examination of the guilt of the defendant alone, even when a
comparative analysis of the probability of the defendant's guilt and that of
other suspects to whom solid evidence points would lower the risk of false
conviction; 239 and (5) the rejection of pattern evidence to establish selective
prosecution and sentencing.2 40
VII. CONCLUSION
Our analysis reveals the tendency of libertarian and individualizing
dispositions to accomplish in the realm of criminal law and procedure what
they are better known for accomplishing in the realms of economic and
social policy: cementing longstanding patterns of advantage and
disadvantage that systematically work to the detriment of poor and
minority populations. 24 1 These dispositions are the real reason for the
criminal justice system's benighted resistance to aggregative and
comparative analysis of conditions crucial to the accuracy and efficiency of
criminal justice. In turn, our analysis reveals the danger of nostalgia for the
fleeting intersection in the Warren Court's Criminal Procedure Revolution
of libertarian dispositions and the promotion of the interests of
disadvantaged populations. For too long, observers enamored of the
Criminal Procedure Revolution have been entranced by its momentary, no
longer effective, co-optation of that libertarian streak in service of the
protection of innocent criminal defendants and the cause of truth.
Romanticizing aside, however, it is now time to get in touch with our
technocratic selves. Without jettisoning juries, adversarial proceedings, or
the character rule, we must put the tools of rigorously analyzed collective
experience at the service of the criminal justice system's self-improvement
and search for the truth.

238. See id. at 667-73 (discussing current legal doctrine's antipathy to aggregative analysis of the
weight of evidence of matches and non-matches in identity cases); supra text accompanying notes 14667.
239. See Liebman et al., supra note 129, at 667-70 ("[T]he realities of our criminal justice system
and the rules limiting evidence of a third party's guilt make it difficult to mount an effective 'I didn't do
it, but I'll tell you who did' defense.").
240. See STUNTz, supra note 11, at 119-22 (criticizing three Supreme Court decisions that have
set the legal foundation for the impermissibility of using pattern evidence to show racial motivation by
prosecutors and other criminal justice decisionmakers).
241. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.

